The relations between Russia, China and North Korea in the Pacific Ocean basin remain the most important element of stability and geopolitical balance in Northeast Asia. It is not only about the balance of naval forces in this region, but also about the system of its general security, which affects in addition the interests of South Korea, Japan, and indirectly the United States. And in this context, a very important role is played, as strange as it may seem, not the power of the naval forces of the states located here, but by a small river, the name of which may very soon become known to all naval specialists and politicians of the neighboring states.

The name of this river is Tumannaya (“Foggy” in Russian), although the river is relatively modest in size, is one of the most geopolitically sensitive water arteries in the world. Located in the geographical heart of North-East Asia, the river takes the source on the slopes of the Holy Pektu, sacred mountain for all Koreans, and its further path lies along the territories of China, North Korea and Russia, between which it forms a natural border for most of its current. In the lower reaches of the Tumannaya (Foggy) there is a point where the boundaries of these three countries converge.

In fact, this river has three official names. For the Chinese, she is Tumenjiang, for Koreans – Tumangang, i.e. a fan. On Soviet and Russian geographic maps since the beginning of the 1970s this river has been designated as Tumannaya (Foggy).

The modern history of the Tumannaya river began in 1860, when Russia and China (Qing Empire) concluded the Beijing Treaty, establishing the boundaries between the two states. Russian negotiators made sure to fix the Russian-Chinese border in such a way that its south point was installed about 17 km upstream from the mouth of the source. Thus, the river delta and the territories adjacent to it began to belong to Russia and Korea (then even the only Korean state of Choson), and the Chinese Manchuria region was geographically cut off from the East Sea.

The alluring proximity of the sea, located just a few kilometers from the soil province of Jilin, has repeatedly encouraged the Chinese authorities to turn to the Russian Empire, and then the Soviet Union with requests for resolving Chinese courts to navigate in the lower reaches of the Tumannaya river, which was invariably followed by the refusal of then Russian officials. So, in 1886, the Chinese delegation, during a joint check of the border line, raised the question of “navigating of the courts of the middle state to the mouth of Tumen-Ula”, about which the corresponding entry in the negotiation protocol was made. The Foreign Department of the Russian Empire in the coordination of this issue refused again to discuss this request of the Chinese side.

The situation has changed only at the end of the existence of the USSR, under the first and last President, Mikhail Gorbachev. In an effort to completely normalize relations with the China, in 1991 Moscow signed an agreement with Beijing on the Soviet-Chinese border on its eastern part. Article 9 of the document recorded: “The Soviet side agrees that Chinese vessels (under the flag of the PRC) can navigate along the Tumannaya River (Tumenjiang) … with access to the East Sea and back.” Further in the same article, the agreement stipulated that “specific issues related to such navigation will be resolved by agreement between interested parties.”

It is symbolic that the DPRK (North Korea), which belongs to the southern shore of the lower reaches of the Tumannaya river (Foggy), was not directly mentioned here, but the reference to the “interested parties” implied the participation of North Korea in solving the issue of navigation along the river if any dispute among USSR and China occurs.

After the collapse of the USSR, for a long time, the issue of navigation of Chinese vessels con the Tumannaya river did not rise in official Russian-Chinese documents. This topic returned to its importance only in December of 2023. In the multi-page joint communique, according to the results of the 28th regular meeting of the heads of government of Russia and China in Beijing, appeared a laconic point that the parties agreed “together with the DPRK to continue the constructive exchange of views on the topic of sailing of Chinese vessels in the lower reaches of the Tumannaya River, including the organization of a joint environmental Inspection of adjacent region.

In May of 2024, this wording was almost literally reproduced in a joint statement by the Russian Federation and China following a visit by Vladimir Putin to Beijing: “The parties together with the Korean People’s Democratic Republic will continue the constructive exchange of opinions on the topic of sailing of Chinese vessels in the lower reaches of the river Tumannaya.”

The same thesis (“continuation of a constructive dialogue on the issue of navigation of Chinese vessels on the lower reaches of the Tumannaya River”) is repeated in a joint communique following the results of the 29th meeting of the heads of government of the Russian Federation and China – Mikhail Mishustin and Lee Qian in August, 2024.

It should be noted that in the 1990s, the issue of Chinese passage to East Sea was actively considered. But not on a bilateral basis between Russia and China, but in the framework of the transnational project “Tumangang”. The project of creating a “Golden Triangle of Growth” in the basin of Tumannaya river at the junction of the borders of three states was initiated in 1990 by the Chinese side at the Jilin province of the conference on economic and technical cooperation in North-East Asia.

The initiative received support from the UN Development Program (UNDP). In 1995, five states (China, Russia, DPRK, as well as Republic of Korea and Mongolia) signed agreements on the creation of an intergovernmental advisory commission of the Tumannaya River Development Program (Tumen River Area Development Program, TraDP). In 1998, the Secretariat of this commission was established in Beijing. In 2005, the Tumangang initiative (Greater Tumen Initiative) was renamed as part of the same five participants. As key sectors for the development of multilateral cooperation under the auspices of this commission were transport, energy, investment, tourism in surrounding areas.

However, in 2009, the DPRK officially left the project and no longer returned to this structure. In this context, one should take into account that since then the balance of world influence clearly shifted. Also, in addition to the extensive opportunities for growth and development in the East, there is another richest potential – interstate conflicts, the most ancient of which are rooted in the period before the beginning of a new era.

Today, the Tumannaya project continues to function, but the practical results of its activities are extremely modest. Although the initiative was originally built on the idea of mastering the Tumannaya River and the creation of a large port and the international transport center at its mouth, no real steps were taken in this direction. Why? The main reason for the failure of the Tumangang project as such was that China was the main its beneficiary.

Chinese Northeastern provinces were to receive a very specific and direct benefit in the form of access through the Tumannaya river to the ocean while for Russia and the DPRK, the advantages from the implementation of the project were at best hypothetical. Moreover, the Tumangang project created serious economic and geopolitical risks for them.

Economic risks are that the commercial navigation for Tumannaya river would create direct competition for the ports in the Primorsky Territory of Russia (Vladivostok, Nakhodka and others) and in North Korea (primarily ports of Rason and Chongjin). There were also fears that the cross-border economic zone, where, due to its predominant weight, China will inevitably dominate, will expose erosion to Russia and the DPRK over their territories in the Tumannaya river basin.

The inclusion of a paragraph on Tumannaya river in the Russian-Chinese statements over the past few months indicates that Moscow is at least discussing the options for granting China navigation rights in the lower reaches of Tumannaya river with direct access of Chinese vessels to the East Sea.

This idea will definitely require the participation of North Korea. For the time being, there is no information about the position of the DPRK on this Tumannaya situation. However, most likely Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong -un discussed issues related to the Tumannaya river idea during a meeting in Pyongyang in June of 2024. This is indirectly evidenced by the fact that during the North Korean visit of Vladimir Putin, an intergovernmental agreement was signed on the construction of a car bridge across the river, which should supplement the long-functioning Russian-North Korean railway bridge “Druzhba”.

Given the stronger current connections between Moscow and Pyongyang, it can be assumed that the Russian side will act as the chief coordinator of the three-way Russian-North Korean Cooperation at the mouth of Tumannaya, if a decision is made to transfer such cooperation into a practical phase.

One trial ball in the direction of realizing the Chinese dream of obtaining an exit to the East Sea has already been launched. Since the spring of 2024, in the Primorsky Territory of Russia and the province of Jilin, China started to promote the so-called “Tumangang Way project”. The idea is supported by the consortium of Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs, and during this year it has been actively discussing. The project provides for the creation of a tourist route in the form of river and sea cruises along the Tumannaya river.

It is assumed that river cruises will start from the Chinese village of Fanchuan, which is part of the city district of the Hunchun of the province of Jilin. Small vessels with tourists will be held along the river, first along the territory of the China, and then along the Russian-North Korean border along the Russian part of the river Tumannaya towards its mouth, go out to the East Sea, and then turn up and return up the river to the departure point-Fanchuan.

The authors and investors of the project are the Chinese Khunchun construction company with limited liability “Light of the Silk Road” (PRC, Jilin) and LLC International Holding Group “Tumangang Way” (Russia, Primorsky Territory).

I would like to emphasize that this is not the first attempt by the Chinese side to organize cross-border cruise shipping by Tumannaya river. Back in 2014, the Hunchun authorities, which are in the immediate vicinity of the junction of three borders, negotiated with the North Korean side about the possibility of navigating of Chinese vessels in the lower course on the Korean half of the channel of Tumannaya river. But then somehow this idea was not implemented in practice.

The question is, is the idea of vessel tours on Tumannaya river would be exclusively commercial and designed for small vessels for tourists or it is conceived as a prelude to open a river for a full -scale freight and other navigation, which will allow China to get a full access to the East Sea? To my assessment, the latest version seems more believable.

A full-fledged navigation for the Tumannaya river will require serious dredging work. There is no doubt about China’s ability to quickly deepen the channel to the necessary parameters if Russia and the DPRK give permission to do so. The Russian-North Korean Railway bridge “Druzhba” represents another obstacle to such Chinese shipping, but Beijing could easily finance the dismantling of the old and the construction of a new bridge under which large vessels can easily pass.

One should also take in consideration that the Chinese land provinces Jilin and Heilongjiang will finally be able to get a direct access to the Pacific Ocean, which will give the impulse to their economy. The intriguing opportunities will appear in the military sector if the passage of Chinese warships and devices is allowed along the Tumannaya river. So, the most modern and well -armed Chinese missile boat “Type 022” with a displacement of 224 tons has a precipitation of only 1.5 meters. This gives him freedom of maneuver even under the current non-favorable conditions for navigation on the cross-border river region.

The average depth of the river here is from 2 to 4 meters and only at the mouth due to constant silt sediments, and sometimes it decreases to only 0,75 meters. The regular ship carries 8 YJ-83 anti-ship missiles on board with a range of 200–250 kilometers, and even with a simple exit from the mouth of the river, it allows the boats to exercise fire control approximately over the third of the water area of the East Sea.

The surface and underwater drones could also follow the East Sea through the Tumannaya river source. It is noteworthy that in March of 2024, the Chinese reconnaissance distillery of long-range type WZ-7 was first seen in the airspace over the East Sea. At the same time, according to the Ministry of Defense of Japan, he flew from the western direction, from the mainland China, through airspace either the DPRK or Russia. If Russia and the DPRK allow transit in its airspace of Chinese UAVs, then in the future they may well allow the passage of Chinese sea drones and warships – why not?

The opening of the Tumannaya river mouth for navigation will inevitably have serious environmental consequences. The lower reaches of the river – the place of nesting of more than a hundred species of birds. At the junction of three borders, this area plays a key role as a place of recreation and food supplies during the seasonal migration of millions of birds – more than thirty rare species of birds usually stop here.

In addition, the Estate of the Tumannaya River is of particular value in connection with the presence of high biodiversity of fish in it – over a hundred species. Obviously, Russia, North Korea and China are interested in minimizing the damage to the unique environment in the economic and geopolitical development of the region by pragmatic advantages of opening of Tumannaya river to serious maritime traffic can change the current status-quo.

The opening of the lower reaches of Tumannaya river for Chinese shipping will require the establishment of special level of political and military confidence between Russia and China. Having allowed navigation on Tumannaya river, Russia, in fact, will provide part of its sovereign national territory for the use of the PRC – Chinese multitone cargo ships and, possibly, even warships. This is a serious political step, especially given the strategic location of the Tumannaya river mouth.

Moreover, the expansion of possible cooperation of Russia and China on the Tumannaya river could become an important stage in the development of their growing strategic partnership. If Russia and China are able to agree on future of Tumannaya river joint use, then their “friendship” really has no boundaries, and there are no forbidden zones in cooperation (like both leaders of Russia and China like to emphasize).