Does the Modern Navy Have a Future? Subtitle: Most likely, only as an element of the military-strategic and political intimidation of the enemy.

The ongoing military conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, as well as the standoff in the Persian (Arab) Gulf between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, have forced a reconsideration of many military doctrines and postulates that only yesterday seemed unshakable. It was on these foundations that the foreign policy and geostrategy of the world’s leading powers were built, and those types of weapons and branches of the armed forces, whose development and modernization had been given increased attention, have suddenly become not only secondary but also completely meaningless in modern combat conditions.

Thus, the question of the existence of airborne troops has practically been removed. Enormous transport aircraft, which previously carried military units ready to be deployed behind enemy lines, along with their equipment, are now being urgently repurposed for assault units and special military operations units. Why?

At the very outset of the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, a 400-strong Russian helicopter landing force in 20 helicopters seized the Gostomel military airfield near the Ukrainian capital, Kyiv. Several dozen transport aircraft carrying troops and equipment were planned to be dispatched there immediately. But not a single one of these aircraft ever took off from bases in Russia’s interior. Why?

It turned out that they would be simply shot down by Ukrainian air defense missiles while still over Russian territory, and would simply never reach the landing site. They would essentially become “flying coffins.” Thus, the classic airborne force format was effectively given a death sentence.

A similar future awaits (one way or another) military aviation itself. Even the latest 5th-generation aircraft, equipped with the most modern technology and electronics, and flown by the most experienced pilots, now pose more like human targets for missile and drone strikes than a real threat to the enemy, as they did just recently. It’s no coincidence that fighter-attack aircraft launch their missile strikes 150-200 kilometers away from the front line, something conventional missile or artillery units could easily do.

Furthermore, purely financial considerations have also come to the fore. For example, during the US military air strike on Iran, the Americans lost two aircraft, each worth tens of millions of dollars. According to recent data, training a fighter-bomber pilot for the US Armed Forces costs 6-7 million dollars. A military aircraft, on which a pilot has spent several years learning and practicing, can easily be shot down by a drone costing several hundred dollars or an air defense missile costing tens of thousands of dollars.

As a result, it has become clear: what’s the point of spending huge sums of money on military aviation of any kind when the same tasks (bombing, missile launches) can be accomplished with far less budget expenditure by the same missile forces and units equipped with modern drones?

And, as disappointing as it may be for sailors and those who have dedicated their lives to the navy, the same fate apparently awaits the navies of all countries around the world—perhaps with the exception of purely coastal maritime patrols, and even then only in coastal waters around the world. This is because any navy, with all its ships, is essentially a living target, easily destroyed or seriously damaged by the highly cost-effective missiles and unmanned aircraft, as well as suicide boats.

Let’s now take a closer look at how the Russian-Ukrainian military confrontation developed, using the fate of the Russian Black Sea Fleet as an example. After the collapse of the USSR, it was divided between Russia and Ukraine. Then, when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in 2014 and established its naval base in Sevastopol there, the remnants of the Ukrainian fleet hastily retreated to what was then the remaining Ukrainian territory.

I would like to note that the Russian Black Sea Fleet is responsible in Russian military plans not only for security in the Black Sea region, but also in the Mediterranean. Together with the Caspian Flotilla, currently based in the port of Astrakhan (formerly it was based in Baku, but now it is the capital of the independent state of Azerbaijan), the Black Sea Fleet reports to the command of the Russian Southern Military District.

To carry out its command missions, the Russian Black Sea Fleet has diesel submarines, surface ships for operations in the ocean and near-sea zones, naval missile-carrying, anti-submarine, and fighter aircraft, marine units, and ground and coastal forces.

It should be noted that since February 2014, the Black Sea Fleet has been directly involved in the war with Ukraine, and it was also actively involved in the annexation of Crimea. Between 2015 and 2022, its forces and assets grew considerably. In addition, the Russian Black Sea Fleet was involved in Russia’s military operation in Syria since 2015, carrying out troop transport and providing cover for the eastern Mediterranean Sea along the Syrian coast.

And starting on February 24, 2022, the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s forces and assets were deployed in the invasion of Ukrainian territory, in the belief that the enemy had no real ability to counter Russia’s naval power. However, the reality of military actions over there proved to be quite different. Even without naval forces in the classical sense (warships, submarines, etc.), Ukraine was able to inflict significant losses on the Russian Black Sea Fleet during the ensuing hostilities.

Thus, by the end of 2024, the Russian Black Sea Fleet had lost 30% of its combat potential. Ukrainian missile units had disabled approximately a third of the fleet’s ships. The Black Sea Fleet’s flagship, the cruiser Moskva, was lost, and at least 20 more ships and boats, as well as one submarine, had been sunk or been seriously damaged. Of the Black Sea Fleet’s 13 landing ships, only five remained operational by that time.

As a result, Russia was forced to significantly reduce its naval presence in the Black Sea, as basing ships in Crimea had become dangerous. In 2024, Russia relocated its ships from the bay in Sevastopol to the civilian commercial port of Novorossiysk.

However, even there, Russian naval ships were regularly attacked by Ukrainian missile and drone units, and now the Russian Black Sea Fleet has moved even further from the combat zone – to the territory of the semi-independent Republic of Abkhazia. Despite its official independence recognized by Russia, Venezuela and Nicaragua, Abkhazia is entirely financed by the Russian budget and hosts Russian troops on its territory.

All these urgent movements of Russian naval forces in the Black Sea are primarily due to systematic strikes by Ukrainian missiles and naval drones, as well as attacks by unmanned boats (mostly of French and British manufacture), which penetrate any bay along the coast and either destroy or seriously damage ships of any type, including (as was the case in Novorossiysk Bay) a submarine moored at the pier.

It is for this reason that the remaining naval forces of the Russian Black Sea Fleet have now largely switched to defensive tactics and are not directly participating in combat operations against Ukraine to support the Russian ground forces.

As a reminder, the most high-profile loss for the Russian side in 2022 was the Black Sea Fleet’s flagship, the guided-missile cruiser “Moskva.” Additionally, the large landing ship “Saratov” in the city of Berdyansk, along with a number of patrol boats, was also destroyed by British-supplied anti-ship missiles. The following year, Ukrainian missiles destroyed the large landing ship “Olenegorsky Gornyak” of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (using a French missile), and a missile attack from Ukraine, unique in scale and the number of assets involved, was launched against the Russian Black Sea Fleet headquarters in Sevastopol.

In 2024, Ukrainian missiles disabled several large Russian warships—including the large landing ships like the “Caesar Kunikov” and “Novocherkassk”, as well as the patrol ship “Sergey Kotov”. It was after this that the question arose of redeploying the fleet from Sevastopol, just over a hundred kilometers from the Ukrainian coast, to a safer location.

However, both last year and this year, the Russian Black Sea Fleet continues to suffer losses in the form of small missile ships (Buyan-M class) and support vessels, such as ferries used for logistical needs to deliver marines to the ground combat zone. This necessitated significant changes to the Black Sea Fleet’s operations amid the ongoing war with Ukraine.

The most significant change was a change in basing location: due to the vulnerability of the main base in Sevastopol to Ukrainian drones, the bulk of the fleet’s warships was transferred to Novorossiysk. At the same time, a significant portion of the naval infrastructure in Crimea was no longer used for the permanent deployment of Russian warships.

Furthermore, Ukraine’s massive use of surface and underwater drones, as well as cruise missiles, forced the Russian Navy command to significantly alter logistics and strengthen the defense of its port berths.

All this has led to the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s ability to blockade Ukrainian ports and conduct amphibious operations (which Moscow had been relying on at the start of military action against Ukraine) being almost completely negated. The remaining naval missile carriers of the Russian Black Sea fleet are now forced to launch missiles at a significant distance from Ukrainian territory.

Moreover, the problems facing Russia’s Black Sea Fleet as the war with Ukraine continues appear much deeper and more systemic than they initially seemed. This isn’t simply a matter of the loss of individual vessels or temporary setbacks, but a fundamental shift in the balance of power that calls into question the very presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in the region.

After all, while Moscow completely dominated the Black Sea naval sphere at the start of the war in 2022, the situation has changed radically: Ukraine, without a fully-fledged navy, has managed to impose new rules of the game and effectively deprived Russia’s Black Sea Fleet of freedom of action in the region.

Today, Russian ships can no longer safely operate in the western Black Sea and near the Ukrainian coast. Any presence there carries a high risk of attacks by Ukrainian forces, through both missile and naval drone strikes. This means the Russian Black Sea Fleet has ceased to fulfill its key functions: exerting pressure on the Ukrainian coast, monitoring Ukrainian maritime activity, and supporting ground forces from the sea.

The key factor behind this change here is the emergence and widespread use of naval drones, which, moreover, are constantly increasing their strike potential and accuracy. This is what Kyiv has opted for an asymmetric strategy, where cheap and numerous missile and drone systems are capable of inflicting significant damage on more expensive and complex naval systems. This is changing not only the economics of combat operations, but also the very strategy of military conduct, both offensive and defensive.

This has altered the very logic of naval warfare in the Black Sea: large ships have become vulnerable, the cost of protecting them has increased significantly, and the traditional advantages of a stronger navy over the enemy are significantly diminished. Russia, despite certain attempts to adapt to the current situation in the Black Sea, has not yet, in my opinion, been able to effectively respond to this previously unforeseen threat.

Another shortcoming is that the Black Sea is a completely enclosed internal basin, making it very difficult to withdraw ships from it through both external and internal waterways for various reasons, ranging from political to purely technical. And it is still unclear how the Russian military command will address this problem.

Iran is threatening America in the Gulf, but America still doesn’t know what to do.

Since the outbreak of hostilities in the Persian (Arab) Gulf, the US naval presence has become the main “player” in the conflict zone. Without it, no operation against Iran would have been possible. Moreover, Israeli politicians would have been far less bold in bombing Iran’s interior without American naval cover. Since the US naval potential is unmatched by any other country in the world, it would seem that the presence of even a single American aircraft carrier in the region could force the enemy to admit defeat and sign an instrument of surrender.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Gulf is developing quite differently. Already, the US naval command in the region has been forced to take unprecedented measures and carry out a large-scale redeployment of its naval strike forces. For example, the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, stationed near Iran (350 km away), was forced to withdraw more than a thousand kilometers from the coast. The aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford even left the dangerous waters of the Gulf, heading for the Red Sea, bound for the port of Jeddah in Saudi Arabia.

This strategic decision was clearly linked to a series of alarming incidents, including Iranian drone attacks on an oil terminal in Fujairah, an American tanker off the coast of Sharjah (both emirates are part of the UAE), and then even reports of an Iranian drone hitting the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln.

At the same time, US President Donald Trump called on major oil importers to take responsibility for the safety of shipping in the strategic Strait of Hormuz. The Iranian military announced the decommissioning of the American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln. Prior to this, Iran released footage of the aftermath of the strike on the American carrier in the Strait of Hormuz.

What are the implications of the new strategic situation in the Persian (Arabian) Gulf following the presence of American aircraft carriers there, as well as the continued presence of US 5th Fleet ships in Bahrain? Following the expected failure of peace talks with Iran, the US deployed two carrier strike groups to the region, blockading Iranian ports. Meanwhile, the Iranian Navy regularly attempts to intercept and inspect merchant vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian boats have launched multiple missile strikes against US Navy ships, including incidents in which US destroyers returned fire. Iranian speedboats have also repeatedly laid naval mines in international and transit waters of the Strait of Hormuz. In response, the US regularly launches precision strikes against Iranian launch pads and boats. In particular, US aircraft and ships are destroying coastal launch sites (for example, near Bandar Abbas) and shooting down Iranian drones attacking US targets. The US Navy also escorts commercial vessels threatened by Iran in the Strait of Hormuz.

Meanwhile, it’s worth noting that the US Navy, even with its aircraft carriers, is completely unsafe in the Gulf. Iran, with its small forces, primarily drones and unmanned boats, is capable of inflicting significant damage on even the largest vessels. And most importantly, it poses a threat to any attempt to use the fleet to support potential ground operations and naval aviation from the decks of aircraft carriers.

Even with its naval fleet virtually destroyed, Iran is capable of inflicting significant damage on the US Navy in the region using submarines, small missile-carrying boats, and various types of drones and unmanned vessels. All this suggests that the role and place of navies in modern military doctrines will henceforth be constantly reconsidered.

I believe that the navy will never be completely abolished as ineffective in modern military affairs. However, the tasks that the navies of the world’s leading countries will have to address will be significantly adjusted, and the further development of sea-based drones and unmanned aerial vehicles will force military strategists planning naval battles in their classic form, even from the very recent past, to radically reconsider their views.