RUSSIAN NAVAL BASE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN: A PRAGMATIC EVACUATION? Subtitle: What to do with overseas naval bases if the country’s government changes?

As is well known, the foundation of the American naval force’s international power potentially lies in its naval bases, scattered around the world, which provide the US armed forces with the ability to quickly and effectively establish a presence in all key maritime and oceanic theaters of potential military operations. This means controlling the planet’s main sea and ocean routes while preventing anyone else from imposing hostile naval rules on them.

Accordingly, any other country that wishes to compete with America in naval presence must maintain and support its own naval bases. While it’s unlikely that anyone in the world will be able to compete with the United States in terms of the total number of such bases in the foreseeable future, controlling individual regions, seas, straits, and shipping routes is, in principle, entirely feasible.

One such country is Russia, which, even in Soviet times, up until 1991, maintained more than ten naval bases abroad. These were referred to as “logistics support points,” but in reality, these points served as important maritime hubs on the main shipping routes of the leading Soviet naval fleets—the Pacific (Cam Ranh Bay base in Vietnam), Northern, Black Sea (Tartus base in Syria), Baltic (bases in Angola, Cuba, and Guinea), and Indian (Aden in Yemen, Berbera in Somalia, and Mahe in the Seychelles).

After the collapse of the USSR, this entire naval base complex fell into serious decline, and until recently, Russia had only one active overseas naval base in Tartus, in Syria, from which Moscow could control the entire Mediterranean Sea. This base played an important role not only during the civil war in Syria but also when Moscow from 2011 to 2022 supported the Bashar al-Assad regime. It also helped supply Russian military units of private companies in Africa with logistics, delivering military equipment and ammunition to ports in the Mediterranean and Atlantic Ocean, which were then used by Russian forces in African countries such as Mali, the Central African Republic, and Burkina Faso.

And then, starting in early 2025, the situation in the Mediterranean region changed dramatically. After the overthrow of the al-Assad regime in Syria, his flight to Moscow, and the complete collapse of the Syrian government army, power in Damascus was essentially taken over by former jihadists and Islamic radicals, whom Russia had been fighting alongside the Syrian government army for years. Now, these same people have become the legitimate government of Syria, and the pressing question has arisen: what to do with the Russian bases in Syria (one of them naval, the other one – the air force)?

I’ll immediately note that the current Syrian authorities are completely anti-Russian in their foreign policy stance. And they have no problem making the presence of the Russian naval base in Tartus unbearable. Meanwhile, the new authorities in Damascus have stated that, under certain conditions, they would allow for maintaining relations with Moscow while prioritizing their own interests. This was stated by Murhaf Abu Qasr, the Minister of Defense of the interim Syrian government, during a visit to Washington. He also emphasized that Russia would be allowed to retain its bases in Syria if it was beneficial to the current authorities and if Russia paid accordingly.

Russia is being offered between $250 and $350 million per year as a possible payment for the Tartus base, and the Syrian side is prepared to extend the new agreement for their presence on Syrian territory for three years, with the possibility of an unlimited number of extensions.

The question here is different: is it worthwhile for Russia to keep its bases in Syria with this kind of government in Damascus? A naval base if the Syrian leadership is extremely hostile and negative toward Moscow, could be ousted from its territory at any moment. Tartus is the only Russian naval logistics hub in the Mediterranean, and the Khmeimim air base, also located in Syria, is a key supply base for Russian forces in the Mediterranean and North Africa.

It is crucial to note that in 2017, Russia received both of these bases on a 49-year lease from the previous Syrian authorities, free of charge. But this is something that completely displeases the current Syrian authorities. For the time being, the Kremlin announced the continuation of political dialogue with Syria regarding the Russian bases.

By the way, former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia, decided that the current Syrian authorities would be unable to reach an agreement with the Russians after his personal collapse. However, the current Syrian authorities believe they can reach an agreement on the future of these bases if it primarily serves their interests. Moreover, Türkiye, which itself plans to maintain its own influence in the region, is actively opposed to maintaining the Russian naval base in Syria.

The Turks want to have complete control over the waters of the entire eastern coast of the Mediterranean Sea, and any Russian naval presence in this region will be a big annoyance for them.

Meanwhile we should understand the following points: what exactly is the Russian naval base in Syria today? What is her military and naval capacity? Is it militarily operational and functional? Officially, it is called the 720th Logistics Support Point of the Russian Navy, but in reality, it is the permanent presence of Russian naval vessels in the Mediterranean Sea, located in the city of Tartus.

The base itself consists of several small functional structures—two floating piers, each 100 meters long. According to Russian law, the naval base in Tartus is the only overseas logistics support point for the Russian Navy (until 2014, the Russian naval base on the Crimean Peninsula, then part of Ukraine, also held this status).

It is also important to note the following. This Russian naval base was located on the territory of the Syrian naval base and was legally subordinate to the 63rd Brigade of the Syrian Navy. The base also housed a Russian guard force of two platoons of marines.

This logistics base for the Soviet Navy in Tartus was established in 1971, in accordance with a bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the Syrian government. This base was created solely to support the Soviet Navy’s operations in the Mediterranean Sea, repairing ships and vessels of the 5th Mediterranean Squadron and supplying them with fuel, water, and consumables.

One of the divisions of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet’s support vessel brigade was based at the naval base in Tartus. In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 5th Mediterranean Squadron ceased to exist, but the logistics base for the now Russian Navy in Syria remained. Until 2007, occasional visits by Russian Black Sea Fleet ships to the Mediterranean Sea were made there, and Russian warships used the Tartus port to replenish fuel and food supplies.

From 2010 to 2012, active modernization of the berths in Tartus began. Once completed, Tartus was intended to become a full-fledged naval base capable of accommodating heavy ships, including cruisers and aircraft carriers. The naval base in Tartus was intended to provide all the necessary equipment for the Russian Navy’s warships, which were tasked with protecting civilian shipping in the Horn of Africa from Somali pirates. This significantly increased the naval force’s operational capabilities, given Tartus’ proximity to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

From the Tartus base, it was only a seven-day sailing distance to the Strait of Gibraltar, through which warships enter the Atlantic Ocean, which in turn serves as the operational zone for ships of the Russian Northern and Baltic Fleets. However, due to a lack of sufficient funding from the Russian Ministry of Defense, this modernization of the naval base in Tartus never took place. As early as 2010, the Russian Ministry of Defense announced plans to establish naval bases not only in Tartus, Syria, but also on Socotra Island in Yemen and in the port of Tripoli in Libya.

However, the onset of the so-called Arab Spring, which resulted in protests overthrowing governments in many countries – former Russian allies, cast serious doubt on these Russian military plans.

Since the start of the military conflict in Syria between government forces and rebels, Russia has actively used this base to supply its troops in Syria, including the delivery of heavy weapons and ammunition. At the same time, Moscow stated that if a pro-Western regime were to emerge in Syria as a result of the civil war, the Tartus base would obviously have to be closed and relocated elsewhere.

Interestingly, according to a statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the naval base in Tartus is not the only strategic location for the permanent operational unit of the Russian Navy in the Mediterranean, as Russian ships can replenish any non-military supplies at the port of Limassol on the island of Cyprus.

However, in September 2013, Russia officially restored its naval presence in the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean Squadron of the Russian Navy, consisting of 10 ships, combat vessels, and support vessels, was permanently reestablished.

To achieve this, the squadron required appropriate bases along the Mediterranean coast, and the base in Tartus was seen as a key element of this Russian naval presence in the region. Following the reconstruction of the base in the Syrian port of Tartus, it is ready to simultaneously accommodate first- and second-rank ships from the Russian Mediterranean group. One of the floating piers can accommodate a first-rank ship (a cruiser or a destroyer), while the other can accommodate two second-rank ships (either a frigate or a large landing ship).

According to one member of the upper house of the Russian parliament (the Federation Council), it is advantageous for Russia to remain in Syria, as it retains favorable opportunities for Russian military vessels. However, given the current geopolitical situation in Syria, an escalation of tensions is quite likely, creating serious problems for the Russian naval presence in the country.

It is worth noting that during the fighting in Syria, the number of Russian military personnel at the Tartus base increased sharply. While before 2011, it numbered only a few dozen, by 2015, at the height of the war, it already exceeded 1,700 specialists from various branches of the Russian army. According to the latest data published by the Russian Ministry of Defense, approximately 1,500 soldiers and officers are currently stationed at the Tartus and Khmeimim bases in Syria.

It is also interesting that, back in December 2017, an agreement between Russia and Syria providing for the expansion of the naval logistics base in Tartus was legislatively approved by the State Duma and the Federation Council (the two chambers of parliament), and subsequently signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin. This document provided for the official expansion of the Russian Navy logistics base in the port of Tartus and the entry of Russian warships into Syrian territorial waters and ports.

As a result, the previous Syrian government transferred the Tartus base to Russia for free use, granting it full immunity from Syrian civil and administrative jurisdiction. The maximum number of Russian naval vessels permitted to simultaneously station at the base is 11, including nuclear-powered warships. This agreement was intended to last for 49 years and could be automatically extended for another 25 years without special notice to the parties.

In addition to military equipment and hardware, as well as military equipment, a church dedicated to St. Righteous Warrior in honor of Russian Navy Admiral Fyodor Ushakov, and in 2020, a bust of him was erected there.

However, the situation around the base changed completely when, in late 2024, following an offensive by opposition forces, rebel military units managed to take control of key Syrian cities, including the capital, Damascus. Syrian government forces announced their surrender, leaving the fate of the Russian naval base in Tartus in limbo.

Immediately after the change of power in Damascus, at the initial stage of the dramatically changed situation, the Russian military command apparently decided to completely evacuate all ships from the base. A partial withdrawal of military equipment from the base also began. But then Russia took certain diplomatic steps to establish contacts with Syrian rebel forces capable of ensuring the security of Russian military bases.

At this stage, the new Syrian authorities have terminated the lease agreement for the civilian portion of the port of Tartus, concluded between Russia and the previous Syrian government. The issue of liquidating or relocating the Tartus naval base is currently under discussion between Moscow and Damascus. In exchange for maintaining the Tartus naval base, the Syrian side is making several demands of the Russian authorities, which they are unlikely to be willing to fulfill.

These demands include the extradition of former Syrian President al-Assad, who is currently in Moscow as a political refugee; payment of a huge sum (approximately $1 billion) for the alleged involvement of Russian troops in the destruction of civilian and military infrastructure in Syria during the civil war; and a demand for Russian investment of $500 million in facilities deemed important and necessary by the Syrian government. Given these demands, Russian military authorities are seriously considering options for relocating the base from Tartus to other, more secure and advantageous locations.

Among them are the port of Tripoli in Libya, which is controlled by units of the army of General Haftar, who is currently cooperating with Moscow (though he could fall from power at any moment, and it is unclear what would happen to the Russian base if it were to be deployed there); Port Sudan on the Red Sea, which is controlled by Sudanese forces cooperating with Russia (but there is a similar threat there – the possible collapse of the regime of Moscow’s partners); and the base in Oran, Algeria.

What the Russian authorities ultimately choose will become known in the very near future, as the Russian Ministry of Defense currently has two important tasks on its agenda. It must maintain its naval presence in the Mediterranean and secure a reliable supply base for its military units currently stationed in several African countries (primarily Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the Central African Republic).

According to the latest reports, the naval base in Lomé, Togo, could become such a base. This issue was discussed during the Togolese Prime Minister’s visit to Moscow during his talks with his Russian counterpart, Putin. However, this would be a base on the Atlantic coast, which would require the transfer of all port facilities from the Tartus base from Syria.