Reevaluating Naval Base Strike as a Means of Securing Sea Control

 * Source: The New Voice of Ukraine (July 17, 2024)

2. Lessons from the Russia-Ukraine War: Proving the Effectiveness of Naval Base Strike

  In the Russia-Ukraine war, Ukraine has been clearly demonstrating the practical utility of Naval Base Strike. The patterns of attack shown by the Ukrainian forces, with their evolving means and scope, are presenting a new operational concept for modern naval warfare. As shown in <Figure 1>, a significant portion of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s losses occurred not during maritime encounters, but while ships were moored at bases or in waters adjacent to them. This reveals that the struggle to secure sea control does not necessarily take place only on the open sea.

1) New Effects of Ground-based Missiles: The Air Strike on Berdiansk Port (March 2022)

In the early stages of the war, Ukrainian forces sank the Russian landing ship Saratov, which was moored at the port of Berdiansk in the Sea of Azov, using an aging Tochka-U short-range ballistic missile. This differs from traditional anti-ship strike concepts that primarily utilize cruise missiles to hit targets at sea. This case proved that even without state-of-the-art weapon systems possessing precise maritime detection and strike capabilities, high-value naval assets can be neutralized by low-cost land-based forces by exploiting the vulnerabilities of stationary vessels(immobility, risk of secondary explosions due to ammunition loading, etc.). Consequently, this attack served as a decisive factor in forcing the Russian military to abandon its Odesa landing operation.

2) Multi-domain Integrated Drone Attacks: The Strike on Sevastopol Port (October 2022)

On October 29, 2022, Ukrainian forces conducted a simultaneous strike on the port of Sevastopol in Crimea, deploying nine Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and seven explosive Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs). This attack is recorded as the world’s first coordinated air-sea unmanned system swarm attack. The frigate Admiral Makarov, the flagship of the Black Sea Fleet, was damaged, but more importantly, the psychological impact was immense. The Russian Navy was forced to retreat into a defensive “Fleet-in-Being” strategy, installing physical barriers such as floating booms and nets at base entrances and extremely limiting the movement of ships to the open sea.

3) The Disappearance of Safe Zones: Long-range Strikes on Novorossiysk Port (August 2023)

As Sevastopol became increasingly dangerous, Russia moved its vessels to Novorossiysk on the mainland. However, Ukraine utilized new USVs(such as Sea Baby and Magura V5) to strike even this base, located approximately 700km from the front lines. This attack severely damaged the landing ship Olenegorsky Gornyak. This signifies the technical disappearance of the concepts of rear and safe zones in naval warfare. The extension of USV ranges has expanded the strike radius deep into the enemy’s strategic depth, instilling a fear that they can never be safe anywhere.

4) Expansion into the Underwater Space: The “Sub Sea Baby” Case (December 2025)

Recently, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) claimed to have successfully struck a Russian Kilo-class submarine within Novorossiysk Port using underwater drones such as the Sub Sea Baby. Video footage of an underwater explosion occurring near a Kilo-class submarine was broadcast worldwide. The emergence of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs) capable of infiltrating and striking while evading maritime radar and visual surveillance could exponentially increase the difficulty of base defense. In particular, the ability to covertly strike strategic assets like submarines suggests that Naval Base Strike tactics have advanced beyond deterring surface ships to the stage of neutralizing underwater forces.

3. Theorization of Naval Base Strike: Strategic Value and Characteristics

Existing theories of sea control have primarily evolved under the premise of physical interactions between platforms—ships and aircraft—at sea. However, technological advancements, particularly the advent of precision-guided munitions and unmanned systems, have expanded the spatial scope of naval warfare from the sea to the land(the base).

It is now necessary to go beyond treating Naval Base Strike merely as tactical air raids for surprise or destruction, and instead theorize them as a fourth means of securing sea control, standing alongside Decisive Battle, Blockade, and Fleet-in-Being. The core of this theorization lies in establishing Naval Base Strike not as an ad-hoc response to accidental situations, but as an independent strategic option and a framework of thought selectable for achieving sea control. Only when this shift in perception and systematic organization occurs can we develop rational doctrines and build appropriate forces capable of winning in the transformed battlefield environment.

The strategic characteristics of Naval Base Strike can be examined through three dimensions: the perspective of the strong vs. the weak, and the scalability of targets.

First, from the perspective of a Strong Power that dominates sea control, Naval Base Strike serve as a key means to neutralize the enemy’s Fleet-in-Being strategy and force a decisive battle. Traditionally, the navally inferior side has preserved its fleet in the sanctuary of a port to pose an uncertain threat to the stronger power, forcing the latter to consume vast resources for a blockade. However, base attacks using precision strike assets provide a strategic advantage by physically destroying these sanctuaries, thereby either annihilating the enemy fleet or luring it out of port to force a Decisive Battle.

Second, for a Weak Power with inferior naval strength, Naval Base Strike serve as an asymmetric means to achieve more active Sea Denial beyond passive defense. The weaker side can launch strikes by identifying vulnerable moments, such as before the enemy’s main fleet deploys to the operational area or when it is moored in port for resupply and maintenance. This creates the effect of an asymmetric decisive battle that can offset an overwhelming power gap in a single stroke and shake the initiative on the battlefield.

Third, the scope of strike targets has expanded beyond simple destruction of combatant vessels to the neutralization of the enemy’s war-sustaining capability(Sustainability) and Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) capacity. Naval Base Strike include paralyzing the long-term operational capabilities of the enemy fleet by destroying logistics support facilities such as fuel depots, ammunition dumps, and dry docks. Furthermore, it is evolving into a comprehensive operational concept that ensures the freedom of maneuver for friendly vessels and offsets enemy sea-denial attempts by directly striking coastal surface-to-ship missile batteries and radar stations.

Nevertheless, while Naval Base Strikes are powerful, they are not a panacea and involve political and military constraints. These are prerequisites that must be considered when codifying this strategy into doctrine. Primarily, there is the issue of political legitimacy. Conducting a pre-emptive strike on an enemy base without a formal declaration of war can maximize the element of surprise, but it carries international legal risks and political burdens, as it may be defined as an act of aggression. Additionally, there is the risk of collateral damage. Since naval ports are often adjacent to civilian port cities, misstrikes on civilian facilities and vessels can lead to severe humanitarian criticism. Therefore, the theory of Naval Base Strike can only be fully realized when high-level political will is combined with sophisticated targeting capabilities that minimize civilian casualties.

4. Proposals for ROK National Defense Policy and Strategy Formulation

The security environment of the Korean Peninsula faces a complex crisis where the existential threat from North Korea overlaps with potential threats from neighboring powers. Projecting the lessons from the Ukraine war onto South Korea’s security reality, it is assessed that the ROK military must urgently undertake the following strategic tasks.

1) Strategy Against North Korea: Establishing a “Maritime Kill Web” and Pre-emptive Neutralization

As the North Korean Navy possesses numerous small vessels and submarines, operations to strike them before they disperse at sea must be expanded. To the extent possible, North Korea’s asymmetric assets, such as SLBM-capable submarines or hovercraft, should be neutralized while moored at base or during the sortie preparation stage to reduce the requirements for maritime operations. Furthermore, by concentrating the guided weapon systems of not only the Navy but also the Air Force and Army to strike command and control facilities and fuel depots at North Korean naval bases, we must develop specific wartime strike scenarios that can early paralyze North Korea’s operational continuity and accelerate the securing of our maritime superiority.

2) Responding to Potential Threats from Neighboring Countries: Utilizing Naval Base Strike Capability as Deterrence

Given the absolute inferiority of our naval power compared to neighboring great powers, Naval Base Strike capability can serve as another means of deterrence. We must strengthen our supersonic anti-ship missile and long-range cruise missile forces capable of directly striking the naval bases or coastal missile sites of neighboring countries in the event of a contingency. This should be utilized as strategic leverage to suppress the will for maritime projection and extinguish crises early by instilling the perception in hostile forces that the safety of their home bases cannot be guaranteed.

3) Strengthening Jointness: Evolution into Multi-Domain Operations (MDO)

In modern warfare, sea control is no longer the task of the Navy alone; the roles of the Army and Air Force are essential. Therefore, we must develop joint operational doctrines that actively utilize the Army and Marine Corps’ tactical surface-to-surface missiles and the Air Force’s precision strike assets for anti-ship and anti-base attacks. Furthermore, in connection with the U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Operations(MDO) or the U.S. Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations(EABO) concepts, we must establish a concept for “Joint Sea Control Operations” where land-based forces can contribute to Sea Control and Sea Denial.

4) Urgency of Defense Measures for Friendly Naval Bases

Alongside offensive strategies, it is urgent to prepare measures to protect our own naval bases from enemy drone and missile attacks. The Ukraine war proved that rear bases are also not safe zones. Therefore, at major naval bases such as Busan, Jinhae, and Jeju, we must establish complex defense systems—including soft kill (electronic jamming) and laser weapons to counter drone/UAV swarm attacks—in addition to existing missile defense networks (Hard Kill). Furthermore, by assuming base-hit scenarios, we must ensure the survivability and resilience of our forces by preparing rapid damage recovery capabilities and functional distribution measures.

5. Conclusion

Advancements in technology and changes in the battlefield environment have elevated the status of Naval Base Strike as a means of securing sea control. The Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates that to dominate the sea, one does not necessarily need to fight only on the water; directly striking the enemy’s base can be an efficient alternative. However, Naval Base Strike are not the only solution. Constructing a strategy solely focused on base strikes while excluding traditional naval strategies that utilize sea-based assets could lead to rigidity in force employment and cause other security risks. Therefore, a balanced approach is required that organically combines Naval Base Strike capabilities with existing sea control strategies using traditional naval power.

In conclusion, the Naval Base Strike, with its elevated strategic status, must be developed into operational concepts and doctrines from the dual perspectives of offensive employment and base protection. Furthermore, by pursuing practical force construction to realize this, we must firmly guarantee sea control—a prerequisite for national survival and prosperity—and achieve strategic flexibility and asymmetric superiority in the future battlefield environment.