KIMS Periscope No. 414
Projecting Maritime Identity: South Korea’s Engagement with the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative
Introduction
The Indo-Pacific has become the primary arena for global economic flows and strategic competition, anchored by its vital sea lanes, dense trade networks, and growing maritime interdependence. Despite this centrality, the region’s maritime governance architecture remains fragmented and insufficiently integrated. Security-centric arrangements coexist uneasily with development-oriented and capacity-building initiatives, often functioning in silos rather than as part of a coherent framework. At the same time, non-traditional maritime challenges such as climate change, illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUUF), disaster vulnerability, and persistent infrastructure and capacity gaps have intensified, outpacing the collective ability of regional mechanisms to respond effectively.
For many Indo-Pacific states, particularly middle powers and smaller littoral countries, participation in overtly confrontational or bloc-based security frameworks entails political, economic, and strategic risks. Concerns over strategic autonomy, economic exposure, and domestic sensitivities frequently limit their appetite for hard-security alignments, thereby constraining the scope for inclusive and sustained regional engagement. This has produced a structural disjunction between escalating strategic competition and the provision of cooperative, rules-based maritime governance capable of delivering concrete public goods.
It is within this governance gap that functional, issue-based initiatives acquire strategic relevance. By foregrounding practical cooperation, capacity building, and institutional resilience over alliance politics, such approaches offer a more inclusive and politically viable pathway for addressing shared maritime challenges. India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) emerges in this context as an effort to reorient Indo-Pacific cooperation towards sector-specific, problem-solving engagement that mitigates strategic polarisation while strengthening maritime governance. Viewing IPOI through this lens is essential to understanding its relevance for the Republic of Korea, particularly as Seoul seeks to deepen its Indo-Pacific role without being drawn into zero-sum strategic competition.
Beyond Security Frameworks: The Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative in Context
Launched in 2019, the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) was conceived as a mechanism to provide ‘first order specificity’ and translate India’s broader maritime vision of ‘Mutual and Holistic Security and Growth for All in the Region’ (MAHASAGAR) that builds on India’s earlier SAGAR framework (Security and Growth for All in the Region), into practical and actionable cooperation across the Indo-Pacific. The initiative articulates seven mutually reinforcing spokes of maritime cooperation: (1) maritime security; (2) maritime ecology; (3) maritime resources; (4) capacity building and resource sharing; (5) disaster risk reduction and management; (6) science, technology and academic collaboration; and (7) trade, connectivity, and maritime transport. By structuring engagement through distinct yet interconnected functional domains, IPOI establishes a modular framework capable of adapting to shifting priorities within the evolving maritime order.
Two features distinguish IPOI from many regional constructs. First, its modular design allows states to participate selectively across individual spokes without committing to the initiative in its entirety, enabling alignment with national priorities and institutional capacities. Second, IPOI is non-treaty based and rests on voluntary participation rather than binding obligations. This flexibility lowers political entry barriers and permits the participation of a diverse set of actors, including advanced economies, developing littoral states, and extra-regional partners—on the basis of interest and capability rather than strategic alignment.
The initiative has already attracted the participation of several like-minded actors including Japan, the United States, Australia, France, and the European Union, many of whom have assumed leadership or co-leadership roles across specific IPOI spokes. This pattern of differentiated responsibility reflects both the functional logic of the initiative and the varied capacities of participating states. Rather than imposing uniform expectations, IPOI enables partners to lead in areas where they possess comparative advantages; whether in maritime domain awareness, environmental governance, disaster response, scientific research, or maritime connectivity. Such an approach enhances operational efficiency while reinforcing the initiative’s core emphasis on inclusivity and voluntary cooperation.
This differentiated and decentralised mode of participation underscores IPOI’s open and flexible architecture (depicted in Fig. 1), which is designed to accommodate variable-geometry coalitions that can evolve over time. States may participate across multiple spokes or confine their engagement to a single functional domain, and leadership configurations can be recalibrated as priorities, resources, and regional conditions change. This flexibility not only lowers political thresholds for participation but also reduces the risks of strategic overcommitment, particularly for middle powers like South Korea and extra-regional actors seeking meaningful engagement in the region without entanglement in rigid security alignments.

Source: Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: A Contemporary Perspective by VAdm Pradeep Chauhan. https://maritimeindia.org/maritime-security-in-the-indo-pacific-a-contemporary-perspective/
Strategic Imperatives for South Korea under the IPOI
Across prevailing Indo-Pacific frameworks, South Korea’s role has largely been circumscribed by structural constraints. Within the Free and Open Indo-Pacific, Seoul is primarily situated through the prism of the US–ROK alliance, limiting its visibility as an autonomous agenda-setting actor. ASEAN-led mechanisms acknowledge South Korea as a dialogue partner, yet provide limited scope for rule-making influence, while episodic interactions with Quad members have not translated into participation in minilateral core decision-making. Consequently, South Korea’s Indo-Pacific engagement has tended to emphasise contribution within existing structures rather than leadership in shaping them.
India’s Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) introduces an alternative modality of engagement that is particularly compatible with South Korea’s self-conception as a global pivotal state. Conceived as a functional, non-alliance-based framework, IPOI prioritises issue-specific cooperation and voluntary leadership over strategic alignment. Its design allows capable states to exercise stewardship over discrete domains, thereby shaping norms and practices without being subsumed into bloc politics. For South Korea, engagement at this level would enable a shift from participation as a supporting actor to contribution as a norm-shaper within an emerging Indo-Pacific maritime governance architecture.
This prospect is underpinned by South Korea’s established maritime capabilities. As the world’s second-largest shipbuilder—accounting for approximately 31 per cent of global orders in 2023—South Korea possesses advanced expertise in ship construction, port automation, maritime logistics, and environmentally sustainable shipping technologies. These industrial strengths are complemented by demonstrated competence in disaster preparedness and response, including public health emergencies and flood management. Together, they position South Korea as a credible provider of maritime public goods, aligning closely with IPOI’s emphasis on connectivity, sustainability, and disaster risk reduction.
IPOI also offers a structured pathway for recalibrating South Korea’s geographical engagement within the Indo-Pacific. Despite its significant dependence on the Indian Ocean—through which more than 90 per cent of Korea’s energy imports transit—South Korea’s strategic focus has historically remained concentrated in Northeast and Southeast Asia, often mediated through relations with the United States, Japan, and ASEAN. IPOI facilitates a more direct and visible engagement with the Indian Ocean Region, encompassing South Asia, Africa, and Indian Ocean littoral states where Korea’s strategic presence and normative influence have been comparatively limited.
This geographical expansion assumes added significance in light of the Indian Ocean’s evolving strategic environment. The region has witnessed growing geopolitical contestation, including infrastructure and port development associated with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. IPOI advances a cooperative, development-oriented framework that foregrounds openness, sustainability, and inclusivity rather than competitive alignment. Engagement within this framework allows South Korea to participate as a responsible stakeholder in Indian Ocean governance while avoiding the optics of strategic competition or zero-sum infrastructure rivalry.
The appeal of IPOI for South Korea is further reinforced by its non-confrontational orientation. Unlike security-focused arrangements such as AUKUS, or to some extent the Quad, IPOI emphasises functional cooperation across maritime ecology, disaster management, connectivity, and capacity-building. This distinction is particularly salient given South Korea’s substantial economic interdependence with China, which remains its largest trading partner. IPOI therefore provides a calibrated platform through which South Korea can demonstrate leadership and responsibility in the Indo-Pacific while preserving strategic flexibility and managing economic sensitivities.
This approach is consistent with the Indo-Pacific Strategy articulated under the Yoon Suk Yeol administration, which envisions South Korea as a global pivotal state capable of contributing to norm-setting and public goods provision beyond peninsular security concerns. IPOI offers a practical institutional pathway to translate this strategic narrative into sustained maritime engagement, allowing South Korea to act not merely as an economic partner but as a contributor to regional governance.
The relevance of IPOI engagement is further shaped by recent political developments in South Korea. The appointment of Cho Hyun as Foreign Minister in July 2025—bringing prior experience as Ambassador to India and as Permanent Representative to the United Nations—introduces leadership with direct familiarity with Indian Ocean dynamics and multilateral diplomacy. Such experience strengthens South Korea’s capacity to act as a bridge-builder and norm contributor within cooperative maritime frameworks, reinforcing the credibility of deeper engagement under IPOI.
Taken together, the convergence of South Korea’s maritime capabilities, the functional and inclusive design of IPOI, and a political context receptive to ocean-oriented diplomacy creates favourable conditions for enhanced engagement. IPOI offers South Korea a structured pathway to incrementally expand its role as a responsible stakeholder and norm-shaper in Indo-Pacific maritime governance. In a regional environment increasingly characterised by strategic polarisation, engagement through IPOI enables Seoul to contribute to cooperative, rules-based, and development-oriented maritime practices while remaining consistent with its aspiration to function as a global pivotal state.
Mapping South Korea’s Maritime Interests onto the IPOI Pillars
Among the seven spokes of the IPOI, three align closely with South Korea’s comparative advantages: Science, Technology and Academic Cooperation; Trade, Connectivity and Maritime Transport; and Disaster Risk Reduction and Management. Together, they provide South Korea with clear avenues to exercise leadership in maritime governance while advancing its role as a maritime middle power in the Indo-Pacific.
The Science, Technology and Academic Cooperation spoke offers a natural entry point for South Korea to integrate its innovation-driven economy into ocean governance. With one of the highest research and development expenditures among OECD countries and advanced capabilities in artificial intelligence, robotics, semiconductors, and satellite technologies, South Korea is well positioned to contribute to maritime applications such as vessel traffic management, ocean and climate modelling, maritime domain awareness, and fisheries monitoring. IPOI’s focus on narrowing digital and scientific capacity gaps creates scope for South Korea to support shared data platforms, technical standards, and collaborative research, enabling it to transition from a consumer of maritime data to a contributor to regional digital ocean governance.
The Trade, Connectivity and Maritime Transport spoke aligns with South Korea’s maritime industrial and logistical strengths. As a leading global shipbuilder and home to advanced port infrastructure—exemplified by Busan’s role as a major smart-port hub—South Korea possesses capabilities directly relevant to IPOI’s objective of building resilient and diversified maritime connectivity. Engagement in this domain would allow South Korea to support port modernisation, green shipping, and corridor development across the Indian Ocean, strengthening supply-chain resilience while expanding its maritime presence in regions such as the Bay of Bengal and East Africa.
The Disaster Risk Reduction and Management spoke reflects South Korea’s experience in humanitarian assistance and resilience-building. The Indo-Pacific remains highly vulnerable to natural disasters, placing sustained pressure on coastal and island states. South Korea’s disaster management systems, including early-warning technologies and a well-equipped Coast Guard, along with its track record in regional humanitarian assistance, position it as a credible partner in disaster governance. IPOI-linked initiatives on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief provide a platform for South Korea to contribute through coastal resilience, responder training, and emergency-response capabilities, offering a domain of engagement that is both politically low-risk and regionally visible.
Collectively, these three spokes enable South Korea to project its technological, logistical, and humanitarian strengths beyond Northeast Asia in ways consistent with ASEAN centrality and cooperative regionalism. Engagement across these domains supports a gradual shift in South Korea’s Indo-Pacific role—from that of a primarily economic partner to a contributor to maritime norms, infrastructure, and resilience frameworks shaping the region’s future.
Conclusion
The IPOI represents a functional and inclusive approach to maritime cooperation at a time when the regional landscape is increasingly shaped by strategic competition and institutional fragmentation. By prioritising issue-based collaboration over alignment, IPOI offers a governance framework that addresses shared maritime challenges i.e., connectivity, sustainability, and resilience, while remaining accessible to a diverse range of stakeholders.
For South Korea, IPOI provides a timely and practical platform to align maritime dependence with maritime leadership. Engagement through selected spokes allows South Korea to project its technological, industrial, and humanitarian strengths into the Indian Ocean and wider Indo-Pacific in ways that are consistent with its aspiration to function as a responsible middle power and norm contributor. Rather than duplicating existing mechanisms, IPOI complements South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy by offering avenues for leadership that are cooperative, development-oriented, and politically calibrated.
More broadly, South Korea’s participation would reinforce IPOI’s credibility as a genuinely multilateral initiative and underscore the role of middle powers in shaping maritime governance through public goods provision and institutional capacity-building. In an Indo-Pacific environment characterised by both strategic uncertainty and shared vulnerabilities, sustained engagement through frameworks such as IPOI offers a pragmatic pathway to strengthening regional maritime order while preserving strategic flexibility.
- Author BIO
Ms Arijita Sinha Roy is a Research Associate at the National Maritime Foundation (NMF), New Delhi, where she is undertaking research on India and how its maritime geostrategies are impacted by those of the Republic of Korea (RoK). Concurrently, Ms Roy is also a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the Korea Institute of Maritime Strategy (KIMS). She is an alumna of the Yeosu Academy of the Law of the Sea (YALOS), convened by the Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries, Republic of Korea, and holds a Master’s degree in East Asian Studies from the University of Delhi. Her work engages with issues of maritime security, Indo-Pacific strategic dynamics, and regional maritime cooperation, with a particular focus on East Asia–India strategic linkages.
- References
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- Aamer, Farwa, and Emma Chanlett-Avery. Cementing the Quad in the Indo-Pacific. Washington, D.C.: Asia Society Policy Institute, September 2025..
- Julienne, Marc. “Opening up the G7 to South Korea to Address Contemporary Global Challenges.” IAI Papers25, no. 30 (2025).
- Disclaimer
The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the view of KIMS.

