MOSCOW’S PACIFIC INTEREST: Subtitle : Why might strategic plans to strengthen its position in the Asia-Pacific region be unfeasible for Russia?

In the current situation in Northeast Asia, the defense activities undertaken by major powers are creating a very tense environment in the region. Rivalry between a number of them is leading to increased mistrust, plus numerous territorial disputes in the East Sea, East China, Yellow and Philippine Seas are intensifying.

Japan still maintains claims to the Russian Kuril Islands, which belonged to Russia after the end of World War II. And after Washington announced the strategic turn of the United States towards Asia, a new impetus was given to strengthening and expanding the American military presence in the region, developing American military cooperation with Japan, South Korea and Taiwan, and large-scale joint military exercises began to be held more often.

The decision by the US military to increase the indefinite presence of 100,000 US troops in the region in 1995 was prompted by the threat of potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula, new strategic challenges from China, and a general need to demonstrate determination to defend American interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

It is also worth considering that the US-Japan military alliance has been significantly strengthened since the approval of new defense initiatives in 1999, under which Japan expanded the United States’ access to its military and transportation facilities on Japanese territory. Japan also agreed to participate in joint military operations “in the adjacent areas” outside the country, which automatically expanded Japanese support for the United States in the region and beyond (for example, during the Iraq War in 2003-2005).

And although the United States, after the Trump administration came to power, has made it clear several times that it will pay less attention to strengthening relations with South Korea and Japan than before, Russia still views the United States as its main adversary in the region. And it is trying in every way to strengthen military and political ties with both China and North Korea.

It is also worth noting that since 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin has officially repeatedly emphasized the importance of the region for Russia’s future, as well as the alleged need for Moscow to pivot to Asia, but it has not achieved much success in this direction. The focus on the Asia-Pacific region has become even more important for Russia after the start of the military conflict with Ukraine and the almost complete freezing of relations in the Western direction, in particular with Europe.

Now let’s see to what extent Russia’s positions in the Pacific Ocean actually correspond to its political and strategic interests declared by the country’s president. Thus, the Russian Pacific Fleet has significantly reduced its potential after the collapse of the USSR, especially in the 1990s and 2000s. Many ships of the former Soviet fleet were decommissioned, and new vessels were not commissioned. The situation began to change for the better only in the early 2010s.

An example of the gradual development of the Russian Pacific Fleet is the inclusion of new Project 955 Borey-class ballistic missile submarines. They are equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles for nuclear deterrence of the United States in the Pacific Ocean. The recent order from the state for new non-nuclear Varshavyanka-class submarines is intended to strengthen the underwater capabilities of the Russian Pacific Fleet and protect its ballistic missile submarines.

Meanwhile, the clearly obsolete Soviet-built surface combat ships remain the basis of the Russian naval presence in the Pacific Ocean, despite the relatively recent commissioning of the frigate Admiral Gorshkov and the corvettes Gremyashchiy and Steregushchiy.

In general, the situation in the region around the Kuril Islands remains tense in strategic terms. These islands are of great military value to Russia. And the military presence on the Kuril Islands allows Russia to protect its strategic submarines based in the Sea of Okhotsk. For this purpose, the coastal missile systems Bastion and Bal, as well as the anti-aircraft missile systems Tor-M1-2U, are deployed on the Kuril Islands.

Meanwhile, despite all the efforts to modernize it on the part of the state, the Russian Pacific Fleet is currently effective only in the coastal zone. It has no aircraft carriers, an insufficient number of aircraft, a shortage of surface ships with modern anti-submarine weapons, and a minimal number of large landing ships. Therefore, the key tasks of the Russian Pacific Fleet at present remain the protection of submarines of the strategic nuclear deterrent forces.

I think it would be a mistake to think that the main threat to the Russian Pacific Fleet is only the United States. For example, Japan is purchasing Tomahawk cruise missiles from the Americans. Tokyo is also paying special attention to strengthening its missile defense systems. This includes the deployment of destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat information and control system and the improvement of ballistic missile defense systems. In addition, Japan is expanding its military presence in the Ryukyu Islands near the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands, preventing China’s naval activity in this region.

The Japanese have deployed anti-ship missiles and modern surveillance systems on these islands, which allows them to monitor what is happening in the East China Sea. Tokyo also plans to purchase Type-12 missiles, Joint Strike missiles for F-35A fighter-bombers and high-precision air-to-surface cruise missiles AGM-158 JASSM.

I will add that the Japanese Navy regularly conducts exercises to combat Russian and Chinese submarines. Let’s not forget that Japan ranks second in the world after the United States in the number of anti-submarine aircraft. Their number significantly exceeds the number of similar aircraft in the Russian Navy, plus they are capable of carrying out joint missions with American allies.

Due to the fact that the United States maintains close strategic and military relations with South Korea, Seoul’s naval forces are also important for the Russian Pacific Fleet in planning to expand its presence in the Pacific Ocean. In recent years, South Korea’s naval infrastructure has shifted to the creation of an ocean-going navy.

The adopted South Korean defense plan for 2021-2025, which focuses on expanding the navy’s expeditionary operations and increasing the defense budget for the purchase of new military equipment, is also aimed at expanding the country’s military exports. Currently, South Korea ranks 9th in the world in terms of military exports, and by 2027, Seoul is expected to rank 4th.

The South Korean government has also approved a $2.73 billion project to upgrade its fleet of 60 F-15 fighters. In addition, trilateral military cooperation between the United States, Japan, and South Korea is still actively developing, which also poses a direct threat to the activities of the Russian Navy in the Pacific Ocean.

Taiwan occupies a special place in the interests of the Russian Pacific Fleet in the region. And above all – in terms of possible coordination of actions with China in the event of a naval conflict around the island with the participation of the United States. In recent years, Taiwan has been actively strengthening its naval forces by purchasing new ships, developing its own ship designs for a possible confrontation with China. The Taiwanese have developed their own Tuo Chiang series corvette, as well as high-speed mine-laying boats to counter potential landing operations by Chinese troops.

Taiwan is also building the ROCS Yushan landing dock ship, which will replace outdated ships and increase the efficiency of supplying the island’s armed forces in the Taiwan Strait. The island’s authorities are also continuing to develop light frigates of the Zhenhai class.

Assessing the build-up of naval power by both the United States and its allies in the region, a number of important conclusions can be made. Thus, the military group of the Russian Pacific Fleet is significantly inferior to both the combined naval potential of the United States and its allies, and to individual positions (aircraft carriers, diesel submarines, military aviation, landing and small ships) and cannot be compared with them at all.

Such a situation is guaranteed to have a negative impact on Russian military potential in the event of a conflict in the region. For example, the United States, Japan, and South Korea are currently deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and Aegis combat system. These systems can neutralize ballistic missiles from the Russian Pacific Fleet that could be launched at US and allied military facilities in the Pacific Ocean in the event of a conflict.

The United States and its allies also have Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor missiles in the region. These systems are clearly capable of reducing the effectiveness of the Russian Pacific Fleet’s use of cruise and tactical ballistic missiles.

It is worth noting that South Korea has developed its own missile defense systems to counter threats from North Korea. This Three Axis defense system includes the Kill Chain preemptive strike system, the Korea Air and Missile Defense missile interception system, and the Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation system.

The United States has also deployed AN/TPY-2 radars in Japan and South Korea. They are located at the Kyogamisaki base on the west coast of Honshu Island and the northern tip of Honshu Island in Aomori Prefecture. From there, regular surveillance of the activities of the ships of the Russian Pacific Fleet is conducted.

South Korea has its own early warning systems. This is the KAMD system, L-SAM radars, the Peace Eye Airborne Early Warning & Control program using various radar systems that are integrated into a wide missile defense network together with the US Navy.

Taiwan also has powerful radar systems. By the way, the PAVE PAWS radar complex purchased from the US is located on the island, which has several E-2 Hawkeye early warning aircraft under its service. All this allows the US armed forces and their allies to quickly process, evaluate and disseminate the information received about a possible military threat from Russia and its Pacific Fleet.

It is important to note that the high level of cooperation between the United States and its main allies in the region increases the effectiveness of their joint military operations against the Russian Pacific Fleet. And the high precision of allied missile guidance at long distances allows them to hit warships, submarines and supply ships of the Russian Pacific Fleet even at a considerable distance from the forces of a potential enemy.

Today, the high-precision weapons in service with the United States include Tomahawk, AGM-158 JASSM, SM-6 missiles. Japan has high-precision weapons in the form of Type 12 anti-ship missiles, and the South Korean fleet has Hynmoo missiles.

Despite the reduction in the overall military potential of the Russian Pacific Fleet, its main striking force remains modern nuclear submarines. Therefore, the main countermeasures of the US Navy and its allies are concentrated on fighting them. These are P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, MH-60R Seahawk helicopters, and advanced sonar systems. These systems are deployed on Virginia and Los Angeles class submarines, surface ships equipped with modern sonar systems. Such vessels include Arleigh-Burke class destroyers and Ticonderoga class cruisers.

All this helps the Americans and their allies successfully track the movements of submarines of the Russian Pacific Fleet. And given the active use of unmanned aerial vehicles in modern systems to ensure the combat readiness of fleets in the Pacific Ocean (and given their use in the military conflict between Russia and Ukraine), they can become a key factor for the US Navy in the fight against the Russian Pacific Fleet.

Let me remind you that the same American MQ-9 Reaper drone (which is actively used to patrol the Black Sea during the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict) has a range of about 1,850 kilometers. The Americans have already deployed them at a number of bases in the Pacific Ocean, as well as in Japan. Japan itself is armed with the RQ-4B Global Hawk, a high-altitude, long-duration UAV. South Korea, in turn, has already begun producing its own Medium-Altitude Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.

Another area where the US rivalry with its allies and the Russian Pacific Fleet will actively develop is underwater unmanned vehicles for mine countermeasures, reconnaissance, and anti-submarine operations. The relevance of this topic is confirmed by the course of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation in the Black Sea, where it was precisely because of the actions of Ukrainian unmanned underwater vehicles (they are supplied to it by Great Britain, Germany, and France) that most of the Russian Black Sea Fleet was forced to relocate from Sevastopol, Crimea to Novorossiysk.

It should be noted that the range of modern underwater drones reaches hundreds of kilometers, which makes their use against coastal and naval infrastructure in the Pacific Ocean especially effective. And drones such as the Boeing Orca, created for the US Navy, can operate autonomously for a long time. The scope of use of unmanned surface vehicles in the Pacific Ocean (analogous to the American Sea Hunter models) for anti-submarine operations and surveillance is also expanding.

It is the unmanned component of the possible forces of the United States and its allies to deliver a preemptive strike that most worries the leadership of the Russian Pacific Fleet in the region. After all, the very fact of deploying such unmanned vehicles near the bases of the Russian Pacific Fleet creates a direct threat to its ships and military facilities. The ability of unmanned systems to operate in close proximity to naval bases without risk to the lives of operators makes them an ideal means of collecting intelligence, identifying targets and delivering strikes at the initial stages of a possible conflict between Russia and the United States in the Pacific Ocean.

There is another area where the rivalry between the United States and its allies on the one hand and Russia and its Pacific Fleet on the other is intensifying – this is military space. American early warning satellites already outnumber similar equipment in Russia by eight times. South Korea launched its first reconnaissance satellite with the help of the Americans at the end of 2023, and then two more. These satellites are designed to detect missile launches by North Korea and conduct space reconnaissance on an ongoing basis.

In general, it can be confidently stated that the naval infrastructure of the United States is gradually approaching the borders of the Russian Federation and the bases of the Pacific Fleet in the Russian Far East. Also, along the Russian borders in the Pacific Ocean, exercises of the aviation or naval forces of the United States and its allies are regularly held.

These exercises partially restrict the freedom of movement of ships of the Russian Pacific Fleet, increasing tensions in the region. For its part, the Russian military department has strengthened over the past three years, the grouping of troops on the Kuril Islands and Sakhalin Island, not only by creating new naval facilities, but also by deploying marine forces with coastal troops of the Pacific Fleet, including those who gained combat experience in the zone of military conflict with Ukraine.

As a result, the following very curious situation is developing. While the United States, South Korea and Japan, even with certain nuances of high diplomacy, today maintain close coordination of their actions at the military level. Taiwan gravitates towards them in organizing unified military actions in the Asia-Pacific region – at least in terms of defending the island in the event of China’s attempt to resolve the issue of Taiwan’s annexation by force and carry out its own special military operation against it.

But on the part of Russia and its supposedly important military allies, no cooperation or real alliance is observed in the Pacific Ocean. Let me remind you that Moscow has a strategic partnership agreement with China, but there is absolutely no component of cooperation and defense alliance. Both sides declare their strengthening political and trade links (the bilateral trade will grow up to 400 bln dollars by 2030) but they do absolutely nothing in the development of joint military cooperation – including the Pacific Ocean area. Although, it would seem, the threats from both the United States and its allies in the region are directed against the interests of both Moscow and Beijing.

Both leaders jointly celebrated Victory Day in World War II in both Russia and China. But in terms of military cooperation, with the exception of rare joint – and even more ostentatious – exercises of the same fleets in the Pacific Ocean, related cooperation has not moved forward.

A somewhat different situation in the region in the military interaction between Russia and North Korea. Here, the leadership of both countries has officially formalized an agreement on an alliance in the military sphere. However, Pyongyang has already twice offered to send its military contingent to the Ukrainian front, but the Russian side is frankly afraid to do so. And after three years of war actions with Ukraine Moscow “suddenly” acknowledged – by President Putin himself – not only the presence of 30-50 thousand North Korea special military units in Kursk region but their direct combat participation in fighting with Ukranian troops.

Nevertheless, it is still unclear what the term “close military cooperation” between the countries means if it is recorded only on paper, but is not implemented in practice? The Russian military leadership presumed that North Korea (if necessary) can deploy up to 250 thousand troops in Russia along the front line (these troops are firstly trained in Buryatia region in Russian Siberian region bordering with Mongolia), and if the peace initiatives of US in this region fail, they can break the front with Ukraine on some key sectors within 2-3 week-time. 

On the Chinese side, military cooperation with the North Korean army is practically non-existent. And this once again confirms the fact that if an acute military conflict arises in the Asia-Pacific region, neither Russia with its Pacific fleet, nor China with North Korea and their armed forces will act and coordinate their efforts together. Although, I think, they can provide some elements of the military structure and weapons to their partners in the event of a truly global crisis in the Pacific Ocean region, especially in case of joint use of their respective naval facilities in the ports of the region.