KIMS Periscope No. 390
What should be Korea’s wise choice amidst the uncertainty of the Taiwan conflict?

The Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy
Director of Center for Maritime Security
Samman Chung
Summary
The Taiwan conflict represents a significant diplomatic and security challenge for South Korea. While the United States is expected to follow a cumulative strategy that tolerates partial losses to achieve long-term strategic goals, China is likely to pursue a sequential strategy that refuses even minor failures. In this context, South Korea must find a strategic balance that supports its alliance with the U.S. while minimizing China’s potential backlash. Achieving this balance requires selective and flexible support, bolstered by economic and diplomatic safety nets and actively cultivating the image of a peace intermediary in the international community. Ultimately, South Korea’s response will shape how it can protect its sovereignty and interests while maintaining essential alliances.
Tensions between the U.S. and China surrounding the Taiwan Strait are not merely a regional dispute—they represent the greatest diplomatic and security challenge of our time and a pivotal concern for South Korea as well. In the event of a conflict, the U.S. and China are expected to adopt fundamentally different approaches: the U.S. favoring a cumulative strategy and China a sequential strategy. In this situation, South Korea must go beyond simply acting as an ally and consider, as a sovereign actor, how to safeguard its national interests and survival.
The United States traditionally prefers a cumulative strategy, which tolerates small tactical setbacks in pursuit of long-term strategic goals. Just as the lessons of the 1942 Battle of Midway showed, temporary or partial losses can be reframed as strategic reorientation opportunities.
In contrast, China’s sequential strategy sees every stage’s tactical success as essential. Under its centralized leadership system, tactical failure could directly undermine the top leadership’s authority. This stark difference in military culture forces South Korea to reconsider its role.
If South Korea were to provide unlimited support at the request of the U.S., our ports, military bases, and intelligence assets could be exposed to significant risk burdens. While U.S. strategic culture might view such losses as temporary and partial, they would be substantial and real for South Korea.
China, meanwhile, is unlikely to tolerate any disruption to its sequential plan. If it perceives South Korean support as a threat to its early operational phases, it may preemptively move to block it—whether by leveraging South Korea’s trade dependence or heightening security tensions on the Korean Peninsula.
This dilemma is not merely a burden; it can also be a chance for South Korea to assert its diplomatic and security agency. Rather than a binary choice between unconditional support and passive non-involvement, South Korea must find a wise balance.
First, it should focus on selective and flexible support, maintaining the alliance with the U.S. while avoiding direct combat deployments. Back-end roles like intelligence-sharing and logistics are more realistic.
Second, South Korea must build multi-layered diplomatic and economic safety nets. Strengthening ties with ASEAN, India, and Europe can mitigate China’s economic leverage. At the same time, fostering technological self-reliance in semiconductor and battery industries is essential.
Third, South Korea should actively present itself as a peace intermediary. By emphasizing its role as a stabilizing middle power at ASEAN, G20, and other multilateral forums, Korea can deter China from treating it as a direct adversary.
Ultimately, the Taiwan conflict is not just about the U.S.-China rivalry; it is a stage for South Korea to prove its strategic autonomy as a global middle power. Alliances matter, but national interest and sovereignty are even more fundamental. Korea must embrace an adaptable, multi-layered response that protects both its security and its autonomy in a turbulent world.
- References
Bowers, I. (Ed.). (2024). Coalition Navies during the Korean War: Understanding Combined Naval Operations (1st ed.). Routledge.
- References
- CNA, “New South Korean government unlikely to commit to Taiwan’s defense: Expert” Focus Taiwan. June 19, 2025.
- Simon Hutagalung, “Balancing Act: South Korea, The UNC, And The Growing Taiwan Crisis – OpEd” Eurasia Review, April 06, 2025.
- Andrew Yeo and Hanna Foreman, “Is South Korea ready to define its role in a Taiwan Strait contingency?” Brookings, March 28, 2025.
