Trump 2.0 and East Asian Security: Risks and Challenges

Abstract

Trump’s apparent Moscow pivot and threatened abandonment of Ukraine, while very bad news for Ukraine and Europe, should not (yet) be seen as a precursor for Washington’s approach to China and Taiwan. All the indications are that East Asia remains a strategic priority for his administration. However, Trump’s intention to use US military and economic power to leverage concessions from friends and foes alike is seriously damaging perceptions of US power and reliability – to both Russia and China’s advantage – while making miscalculation and war in Europe and Asia more likely.

Introduction

In only his first few weeks back in the White House, US President Donald Trump has done more damage to the credibility of US security guarantees, foreign policy principles, and leadership than any previous post-war US president. His support for major Russian concessions in his Ukraine peace deal plans, including the granting of Ukrainian territory captured by Russia and a veto on Ukraine joining NATO, sent European leaders scrambling to shore up the trans-Atlantic alliance and NATO’s own credibility. Confidence in Trump’s commitment to European security then further plummeted as US allies and partners around the globe watched President Trump and Vice-President JD Vance berate and bully Zelensky during a televised Oval Office meeting before then throwing the Ukrainian delegation out of the White House.

The Ukraine conflict has been closely watched in every Asian country with governments seeking both lessons on the nature and likelihood of a similar conflict in their own region and, in particular, clues on how the US would react to any regional escalation by Beijing. The military, political, and economic support the US and its alliance partners so far have given Ukraine – and the high-cost Russia so far has paid for its invasion with little success – has helped bolster belief that taking Taiwan by force remains too risky a proposition for Beijing. But East Asian policy makers and analysts observing the current breakdown in trans-Atlantic relations now no doubt worry Beijing’s thinking on Taiwan may change in light of Trump’s transactional foreign policy style and willingness to up end long standing alliance relationships and US foreign policy principles.

The good news is that Trump’s apparent Moscow pivot and threatened abandonment of Ukraine, while clearly very bad news for Ukraine and Europe, should not (yet) be seen as a precursor for Washington’s approach to China and Taiwan. All the indications are that East Asia remains a strategic priority for his administration – as per his first term 2017 National Security Strategy’s recognition of East Asia’s importance and of China as the pre-eminent threat to US interests and national security.

The bad news, however, is Trump’s foreign policy agenda may spectacularly backfire given the shallow understanding of US power and its sources it is based on; its often-false assumptions; and its ends being guided by an erratic mix of perceived domestic political imperatives and various personal ambitions (a Nobel Peace Prize?) and grievances. Indeed, what has so far become clear is Trump’s intention to use US military and economic power to leverage concessions from friends and foes alike without any regard for reputational or material cost.

Trump’s Moscow Pivot: Implications for Taiwan and East Asia

Some observers see Trump’s most recent public embrace of Putin and sympathy for Russia’s interests and invasion of Ukraine as an attempt to repair relations with Moscow in the hope of stalling closer Sino-Russian security ties. In addition to preventing a China, Russia, and, probably, Iran axis from forming, an improved US-Russia relationship, under this thinking, would allow Washington to better focus its resources on containing China’s rapidly growing influence in East Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific. Trump’s past and current statements on China, his first administration’s strong diplomatic and military support for former Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s Indo-Pacific doctrine and the Quad, the make-up of his (nomenklatura-like) new cabinet and key advisor selections, and recent statements on China and regional US partners by senior administration officials all are consistent with this interpretation, which some have labelled a “reverse Nixon” strategy”.

But, despite Trump’s record of pursuing unrealistic policy outcomes, it is doubtful his administration believes a pro-Russian peace deal with matching Moscow pivot could improve relations with Russia to an extent where China-Russian cooperation would be significantly affected. The Nixon comparison, while plausible, is weak. The Sino-Soviet split was well confirmed by 1972 when Nixon visited Beijing; Putin and Xi’s so-called “no-limits” relationship is very different and in far better shape. Russia’s economy is now highly dependent on its China trade relations, and diplomatic and military cooperation between both countries has significantly increased over the last decade.

A better and simpler explanation may be that Trump and his advisors see Russia and its Ukraine occupation as less of a threat to US interests than Chinese expansion in East Asia (the conventional view), and also as an opportunity to force greater defence spending and support for Ukraine from the NATO states, thereby reducing the US defence burden in Europe, freeing up US military resources for East Asia, and giving Trump an important political victory at home.

Taiwan’s location and circumstances make it very different to Ukraine and therefore at far less risk of becoming victim to Trump’s transactional policy inclinations. In addition to being more difficult to invade and occupy, Taiwan is of far greater geostrategic value and enjoys long standing bi-partisan Congressional support. Taiwan and East Asia’s strategic importance also makes the risk of a Trump-Xi grand bargain very low given the incompatibility of US and China’s core interests in the region and elsewhere; neither side would be willing to give up what the other wants, which, among other things, includes Taiwan and control of the first island chain. Indeed, A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would impose an immense human and economic cost both regionally and globally, but if successful would gift China almost the entire first island chain, in addition to Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. US power and prestige would be irreparably damaged as a consequence, ending more than eight decades of global US leadership and primacy.

Managing Policy Uncertainty Under Trump 2.0

The continued US military presence and Washington’s often repeated commitment to its alliance partners and the rules-based order have been the main obstacle to China cementing its maritime claims and fully realising its regional leadership ambitions. But even with the current US presence and assurances, some regional states are struggling to resist China’s increasing grey zone encroachments and usurpation of their sovereign maritime rights. And as the reach and power of China’s navy continues to grow, as demonstrated by the PLAN’s recent live fire exercises near Australia’s Pacific coast, so will Beijing’s ability to leverage further concessions from smaller states unless the US and like-minded regional states are able to develop deeper and more effective security cooperation. US power is indispensable in keeping East Asia free and open but there are very real material and political limits to US deterrent capabilities that make continued regional security cooperation equally essential to the current rules-based order’s survival.

Trump’s bargain driven America first and principles last foreign policy approach, however, is making US policy and intentions highly unpredictable, and alignment with the US, rather than China, less enticing as a result. Beijing has been working hard to erode regional support for, and confidence in, US leadership and commitment, and is no doubt very pleased with recent events in Europe. ASEAN loyalties already are divided between Beijing and Washington while two of ASEAN’s most powerful members, Indonesia and Malaysia, continue to hedge their relationships with both powers. Trump administration attempts to leverage compliance in Asia through tariffs or by threatening to limit military support as he has in Europe would only further weaken confidence in the US led order and drive more states to align with China.

The major challenge for US allies and partners in this more unstable environment will be how to balance their economic, trade, and defence interests under the threat of US tariffs and possible, but for now still unlikely, abandonment or military conflict. These calculations will be further complicated by uncertainty over whether Trump’s transactional style and beggar thy neighbour policies are a temporary feature of US foreign policy limited to his final term, or if they will become the new normal in Washington. Questions about how much and what governments should be willing to sacrifice, both economically and politically, in their relations with an “America First” White House will add further complexity and make the domestic politics of managing relations with the US much more difficult.

Given the inherent uncertainties of a Trump presidency, but also the important differences in how Europe and East Asia appear to figure in his administration’s foreign policy thinking, the best short term response for East Asia’s status quo states at this still early stage is to: i) continue cross bracing the hub and spokes alliance system; and ii) further expand defence and security cooperation and capability, especially in the maritime domain, between alliance and non-alliance states as broadly as possible. Building more and better security cooperation between like-minded states will, in addition to forestalling greater burden sharing demands from Washington, strengthen regional deterrence credibility and make it more difficult for China to target individual states.

Conclusion

US leadership of the international order always has relied on more than only America’s great military and economic advantage for its authority and effectiveness. It has been at its strongest when seen by others to abide by and protect the post-war order; and has been at its weakest when, as now, the US commitment to the order and its principles is in doubt. Trump’s trashing of alliances and partnerships is seriously damaging perceptions of US power and reliability – to both Russia and China’s advantage – while making miscalculation and war more likely.

The only foreseeable short term prospect for at least a partial return to normal service in Washington at this point is a GOP defeat in next year’s Congressional mid-term elections. Until then, US allies and partners have little choice other than to hope for the best and prepare for the worst: a more dangerous and less stable international order in which “the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must”.