INDO-PACIFIC REGION: RUSSIAN INTEREST? Subtitle: Military campaign in the center of Europe reduces Moscow’s ability to play an active role on its eastern borders

As follows from the analytical reports used by the US Congress, over the past three years, the strategic and geopolitical importance of the Indo-Pacific region has increased dramatically. At the same time, if previously the US primacy in this region was essentially not contested by anyone, now the situation has become radically different. The priorities in foreign policy of Russia, China, India, and a number of ASEAN countries are changing. At the same time, there is a clear division into “friendly” and “unfriendly” countries, which, according to the new classification adopted in Russia, are becoming irreconcilable rivals and even enemies.

The outbreak of the conflict around Ukraine has significantly changed Russia’s interest in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, it would be a big mistake to think that it was the Ukrainian crisis that became the impetus for Russia’s so-called “pivot to the East”. Yes, over the past three years, bilateral trade between Russia and China has reached $230 billion, and trade between Russia and India has increased sixfold. However, these figures were achieved by an unprecedented growth in Russian oil exports to both countries, this trade is conducted at huge discounts from the Russian side, and although it brings Moscow a certain monetary income, it does so at the expense of other important trade partners of yesterday.

Thus, Moscow has included Japan and South Korea, the two largest foreign trade partners in the region, in the list of “unfriendly” countries. And the United States and its allies maintain the toughest sanctions against the Russian Federation, which largely isolates it from important trade markets and creates significant tension on its eastern borders.

It is significant that if during the Cold War the Asia-Pacific region was a zone of naval rivalry between the USSR and the USA, now the picture has changed significantly. Since American political scientists have “attached” the Pacific Ocean region to the Indian Ocean basin, then in this context, on the one hand, there are now two influential Asian powers on the world map – India and China. On the other hand, they are connected through important sea arteries through interaction – including by sea – with the countries of Southeast Asia that are part of ASEAN.

The waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans wash the shores of the four largest economies in the world; 75 percent of the world’s population lives in this region and there are large deposits of minerals that are critically important for the development of the economies of our entire planet. At the same time, the presence of large navies, for example, in the United States and China (the Russian Pacific Fleet today is roughly comparable to the combined power of the fleets of Japan and South Korea – the main US allies in the region) does not at all mean their complete hegemony over the main trade and transport routes.

Meanwhile, the course of the conflict around Ukraine and the attack of Houthi groups in the Red Sea basin on American and British ships prove that there is a gradual revival of the importance of the so-called “mosquito fleet”, with whose forces it is quite possible to cause much larger ships either serious damage or even sink them (as happened with the Russian cruiser “Moskva” in the Black Sea). And for Southeast Asia with its shallow seas and narrow straits, such a threat may really exist – in the event of a military conflict in the region. And then the main transport and trade routes of the entire Indo-Pacific basin will be easily blocked.

Before assessing the current position of the Russian Navy in this region, I think it is appropriate to assess the naval forces of other powers that have access to both the Pacific and the Indian Ocean basin. This is especially important given that the conflict around Ukraine, which theoretically takes place far from the main communications routes of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, but in fact significantly affects Russia’s naval interests precisely on its eastern borders.

For example, the Russian Pacific Fleet Marine Corps units, as well as part of its support aviation, are practically fully involved on a rotational basis in the conflict with Ukraine. Last summer, a military cooperation agreement was signed and ratified in the fall between Russia and North Korea, which implies direct military support by both parties to each other in the event of a military conflict or a threat to their sovereignty (and in the case of Ukraine, this is exactly the kind of conflict).

It is also quite obvious that the United States remains Russia’s main adversary both around Ukraine and in the world. Which automatically translates to the Asia-Pacific region and its waters. Without a doubt, today it is the United States that remains the hegemon not only in the Pacific, but also in the World Ocean as a whole. They have the largest and most technically equipped navy in the world, developed port and shipbuilding capacities.

After President D. Trump and his team came to power in Washington, the topic of combating the growing power of China has become fundamental for them. To combat Beijing, the Americans will use mechanisms to gradually reduce their economic dependence on China, and will continue to form alliances and unions in the region that will allow Washington to partially shift the task of containing the Chinese to its closest partners (these are alliances such as Quad, AUKUS, “Five Eyes” and ANZUS).

D. Trump will make significant efforts to strengthen cooperation in all areas with India, which he sees as an important tool and counterweight to China’s growing power. In the Pacific Ocean, the Americans will continue to develop the concept of the so-called “island chains”, the first of which runs along the coasts of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines, the second – the same Japan, the island of Guam and down to New Guinea, and the third – along the chain of the Hawaiian Islands, the islands of Tonga and down to New Zealand.

As for China, the main opponent of the United States in this region, it still has a relatively small navy compared to its global ambitions and the need to protect their implementation far from the Chinese shores. Meanwhile, starting from the end of the last century and thanks to the “Chinese economic miracle”, Beijing was able to ensure high rates of economic growth of the country, with the help of which it began to form a shipbuilding and port base.

Over the past ten years, the Chinese navy has been the fastest growing in the world. It is capable of not only effectively ensuring the defense of the Chinese coast, but also supporting China’s claims to disputed territories in the East China and South China Seas with its naval fist, as well as guaranteeing the safe passage of Chinese merchant ships in areas of pirate activity in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

Today, China has a powerful merchant navy, ensuring the export of Chinese goods to world markets, as well as one of the largest fishing fleets in the world. Beijing also actively sells or gives away its warships to “friendly countries”, thereby helping them, on the one hand, to strengthen their own fleets, and on the other hand, tying these countries to itself economically.

It should not be forgotten that China’s geopolitical rival is not only the United States, but also India. It could be noted that until 1971, the beginning of a major military conflict with Pakistan, India’s economic and political presence in the region was modest, and Delhi had no naval ambitions either in the Indian or Pacific Oceans.

However, at the beginning of this century, India began to implement a large-scale shipbuilding program with the goal of creating powerful and modern naval forces. Now India has several aircraft carriers, a significant number of destroyers, frigates and corvettes, and is independently building its own production of nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles on board.

It is also important to note that India has developed fairly friendly relations with all of its closest neighbors in the region except Pakistan and China. And this is despite the fact that the Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean is actually weak and does not seriously threaten India. However, this does not prevent the Indian military and political elites from considering China to be their main competitor in the region (and not the United States).

India generally considers itself to be a kind of unofficial mistress in the Indian Ocean. And for this, Delhi is creating a network of naval bases and radar stations both on its territory and on the territories of small island states (Mauritius and the Seychelles). A key element of Indian defense are the Andaman Islands, where the Indian naval base is located, controlling the exit from the Andaman Sea to the Bay of Bengal.

According to official documents from the Indian Ministry of Defense, the country must strengthen its naval presence in the Indian Ocean in order to be able to cut off its export routes to European markets in the event of a military conflict with China, as well as obtaining oil from the Persian (Arab) Gulf region.

However, this tactic was seriously called into question after the start of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Due to the fact that Russia sharply increased oil exports via pipelines to China, and at the same time increased oil supplies by tankers to India several times. In addition, India has been actively implementing the Sagarmala program in recent years to develop ports and infrastructure within its own country.

It is interesting that if earlier in the region of both the Pacific and Indian Oceans the influence and presence of a number of European countries was noticeable, now it remains only minimal. Perhaps only France, which has its island territories in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans, can really influence something in these regions. Plus, Great Britain, which maintains ties with the countries of the British Commonwealth, as well as Italy (cooperation with Eritrea and Egypt in the Red Sea region), retains a certain influence here.

Japan deserves a special mention regarding its naval presence in the Pacific Ocean region. It is the key and main partner of the United States in the Pacific Ocean and an important element of two “island chains” to contain China. Even without the influence of the United States, Japan has been actively developing the military potential of its Self-Defense Forces in the last decade, and its navy is approaching the number of ships of the Russian Pacific Fleet.

I think that when considering the military-political situation in the Asia-Pacific region, we cannot discount the continent-state of Australia. Yes, it is traditionally in the sphere of influence of the United States and, to a lesser extent, Great Britain, but its main trading partner is still China. And Canberra will most likely not rabidly focus only on Western allies in the event of a military conflict between China and the United States.

Nevertheless, at the moment, Australia takes a sharply anti-Chinese position, participates in all US plans to contain China, and in the event of a military confrontation with Beijing, will be responsible for the southern flank in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The role of New Zealand in this case is practically invisible, although it fully supports the Western position in the Asia-Pacific region, and if necessary, will provide albeit insignificant, but still assistance to a united coalition led by the United States.

Last but not least, it is worth mentioning the ASEAN countries, since they are supposedly important for the Indo-Pacific region in terms of territory and population, but in all the years of their existence as a single association, the states of the region have never created a full-fledged military alliance. Which makes this Association completely defenseless in the event of a military conflict between the United States and China.

Although at least four ASEAN countries can, if necessary, significantly complicate shipping or completely block the Strait of Malacca. Moreover, Singapore with its large port and military base may play a key role in this. And even given that it is closely connected in the military sphere with the United States, it is unlikely that it will do anything against the will of Washington in the event of a conflict in the region.

Meanwhile, the vulnerability of China’s sea routes in the event of a blockade of the Strait of Malacca may well be resolved by building a canal through the Kra Isthmus, which, on the one hand, removes Singapore from the “great game”, and, on the other, sharply increases the influence of Thailand.

The Indonesia factor is also important in this case. It controls the largest number of straits in the region that connect the Pacific Ocean with the Indian Ocean. These are the Strait of Malacca, the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra, the Makassar Strait between Kalimantan and Sulawesi, the Bali Strait between Java and Bali, the Karimata Strait between Kalimantan and Belitung, the Molucca Strait between Sulawesi and Halmahera, and a number of others.

For ASEAN countries, it is worth considering that the very essence of foreign policy is not to interfere in anything, to maintain neutrality on all key disputed positions, and to maintain smooth and mutually beneficial relations with both the United States and China. Trying to impose sanctions against these states (for example, the current administration in Washington is considering this option to put pressure on China) may be counterproductive. If the Americans exert such pressure, then the ASEAN countries will help China, which is completely disadvantageous for D. Trump and his team.

And here again it is important what position Indonesia and its new president will take in developing their naval forces – a former military man himself, and who has a good idea of the potential theater of military operations around the 17,500 Indonesian islands. And in order to be able to conduct a more or less independent policy in the region, Jakarta needs to significantly strengthen its naval forces.

At the moment, the Indonesian Navy is quite balanced, capable of patrol service and conducting anti-piracy and anti-terrorist operations in its coastal waters at most. But if an American-Chinese conflict begins, Indonesia will have to fight any fleet that wants to pass through the straits without its permission.

The Indonesians will then need sea drones, mobile coastal anti-ship systems, low-noise submarines with greater autonomy and powerful weapons, torpedo stations designed to operate against enemy submarines, as well as systems that provide covert remote mining (in this area, Jakarta has already asked Russia for help).

As for Russia’s position in the Indo-Pacific basin, here we can only talk about Moscow’s naval presence in the Pacific Ocean. To date, attempts to create a naval base in the Indian Ocean have not led Moscow to success: agreements for such a base in Sudan remain unrealized due to the unstable political situation in that country. Moscow has not seriously considered the proposals to create a similar base from the government of Eritrea, expecting that something reliable and profitable would come out with Sudan.

But in the Pacific Ocean, several trends are visible at once that directly affect Russia’s naval presence. Theoretically, cooperation with ASEAN countries, and especially with Vietnam and Myanmar, promises to be the most reliable. Meanwhile, it is also important for Russia to ensure the safety of those ships that carry Russian cargo, but fall under the category of sanctions. Thus, Russian ships have repeatedly been detained in European waters while carrying sanctioned cargo, plus they were prohibited from entering the ports of Bangladesh and India, since they were included in the registers of US sanctions lists.

To protect these ships, the Russian authorities are currently considering options for strengthening their naval presence along the entire route, and in certain coastal areas they will ask the fleets of so-called “friendly countries” to ensure their protection (although it is not very clear who, and on what basis, Moscow can be considered such countries in the basin of either the Pacific or Indian Ocean). In addition, Russia and a number of countries in the region will jointly participate in the development of ports, the construction of terminals, which will help solve the problem of sanctioned ships.

It is worth mentioning separately the current situation of the Russian Pacific Fleet, which, due to the rather calm situation in the region, has remained on the periphery of supply and provision of naval power for many years in comparison with the Black Sea, Baltic and Northern Fleets of the Russian Federation. Now, however, the increasing tension in relations between Russia and the United States, as well as after the change of power in the White House between China and the United States, the active militarization of Japan are forcing Moscow to pay increased attention to strengthening its Pacific Fleet.

This will certainly require the modernization of the port and shipbuilding infrastructure of Vladivostok, as well as the expansion of railways connecting the European and Pacific parts of Russia. Russia will also be required to completely revise its relations in the field of naval cooperation with countries such as Vietnam, Myanmar, and especially Indonesia.

This also concerns the creation of two or three military bases at first (they can be called service and support points like the port of Tartus in Syria on the Mediterranean Sea, but this will not change the essence of the matter), renewing cooperation with Vietnam on the Cam Ranh base, offering the military leadership of Myanmar to create at least a service point for the ships of the Russian Pacific Fleet Navy in the Indian Ocean. And it is quite possible to negotiate with Indonesia on the sale or joint development of new types of naval weapons, in particular drones, detection and tracking systems (although the United States will certainly interfere with this very much).

In general, being focused on the armed conflict with Ukraine, and the quite possible confrontation with individual NATO countries in Europe, Russia will simply be forced to strengthen its positions in the Indo-Pacific region. Otherwise, its diminishing influence will very soon affect not only its naval presence in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, but also the ability to safely and reliably conduct trade in their waters.