Salient Maritime Security Challenges and the Fog of War in the South China Sea

Since antiquity the ability to defend a territory, and later, a state, was regarded as a basic value. Defense and security are public goods. In planning for war, governments need to assess the foreseeable economic and social consequences of war and account for the unintended consequences of armed conflict (De Wet & Liebenberg, 2012). In war, military capability, economic prowess, internal and external pressures and public reaction combined as integral inputs of the policy process (Singh, 2000).

Karl von Clausewitz stated that war is the continuation of politics by other means.  He emphasized that a nation must bring to bear its full moral and material forces to destroy the enemy’s means and will to resist (Von Clauswitz, 1974). Stoessinger contends that the causes of past wars had not taken into account the “human essence of the problem”, since wars were “after all begun by people” (Stoessinger, 1993). Warfare represented an extension of the hunt and utilized similar weapons and tactics. With increasing population growth, the competition among states became more intense and warfare more devastating. This trend led to the development of military preparedness to guarantee victory whenever the nation went to war, which paved the way for the organization of standing armies (Preston, et. al., 2001).

Leaders play a significant role in propelling nations into war. In this case, the most important question is this: Does Chinese Premier Li Jinping want war against the Philippines in the South China Sea? The IISS Asia Pacific Regional Security Assessment of 2024 pointed out that China’s military and maritime security assets in the South China Sea has grown more threatening (Institute of International Security Studies, 2024).

The Philippines claims Scarborough Shoal, (locally known as the Bajo de Masinloc) which is located 118 miles from the Philippine island of Luzon, is known to be within the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone. China has claimed the shoal and calls it Huangyan Dao. Recent events contributed to heightened tensions in the South China Sea that may lead these two nations into the brink of war. First, the Chinese government delimited and declared the baselines of the territorial sea adjacent to Huangyan Dao (Xinhua, November 11, 2024). Second, the People’s Liberation Army Southern Theater Command implemented combat readiness patrols to ensure that all personnel and equipment remain in full combat readiness and ready to respond to any accidental escalation or external attacks (Global Times, November 14, 2024). Third, a Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources aircraft flew a group of journalists over Scarborough Shoal last December 19, 2024. Reporters from the Philippine Daily Inquirer stated that Xianning, a Chinese frigate, sent 40 radio challenges to warn the plane that it was over Chinese “territorial airspace.” Moreover, the journalists in the flight observed several Chinese warships and patrol cutters in the area (USNI, January 1, 2025). Fourth, the Chinese navy and air force conducted a second combat readiness patrol last December 30. Several military aircraft, consisting of two Su-30 fighter jets, an H-6K bomber and a Shaanxi Y-8 transport plane, and three naval ships led by a large destroyer,  Xianyang, were deployed (Benarnews, December 30, 2024). Fifth, Chinese Coast Guard vessel 5901 was monitored along Capones Island, Zambales which consists of another case of maritime intrusion into the Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone ( Manila Standard, January 5, 2025). For an adversarial nation such as China, the show of military might may conceal political will to launch real military operations or it could be a prelude to large-scale military operations. Military exercises have been used as a hybrid threat instrument. China continues to exploit legal grey zones within the context of military exercises (Siekiera, 2024).

The People’s Republic of China has pursued as an integral part of its military strategy the doctrine of “active defense deterrence” as a way to “compel an adversary to submit” (Koven, et. al., 2024). Likewise, China’s strategy employs Thomas Schelling’s use of “coercion”, which consists of specific actions undertaken by a state to influence the behavior of a target. These actions showed the indirect and psychological effects of using armed force. The interests of the state encompass intangible factors such as the norms of sovereignty, historic rights, reputation, and status. China uses public communications such as radio challenges to communicate its resolve to use force in particular issues. In brief, China uses clear signaling to portray strength and resolve to its targeted state (Siebens, 2024).

These developments highlight the importance of military preparedness on the part of the Philippines. A country can prepare itself for war based on its perception of the potential causes of war that existed in their environment – including who they might have to fight where, when and for what reason, in this case, defensively. While the Philippines continues to pursue peaceful means, the country’s leadership needs to determine when, where, against whom and under what circumstances its armed forces might be required to fight and then prepare accordingly. President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. has identified the “red line” (an event or occurrence that is deemed unacceptable): “Any Filipino serviceman or citizen killed by a willful act in the South China Sea comes very close to what the Philippines defines as “an act of war.” (The Straits Times, June 1, 2024). The second element of military preparedness is penetrating the fog of war by studying past wars and gaining lessons learned on factors that governs success or failure in war (Visser, 2012).

The Philippine response is three-pronged: a.) adhering to international law in the maritime domain through the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act, which reinforce maritime policies for economic development and for national security; b.) enhancing security alliances with the US, Japan, Australia and the European Union; and, c.) advancing its military modernization program through the purchase of Typhoon missiles from the US and the development of the military-industrial complex through the Self-Reliant Defense Posture Revitalization Act.

However, the Philippine response seriously lacks a fourth strategic component: firm public support in case of the possibility of war. The Philippine government needs to start to engage the local population in a frank public discussion of the country’s capacity for self-defense and the resolve to fight in case of possible war in the future. For Philippine Congress to declare war against another country, it needs the full support its citizens. The Filipino will to fight is a function of patriotism (love of country)  and the resolve to win. Furthermore, it is also impacted by the public perception of Chinese military might and China’s cognitive warfare. Filipinos need to be wary of Chinese coercive actions, as the risks of miscalculation are high. There is a need to measure public sentiment on going to war if there is a moral reason to do so. Achieving and sustaining public support for going to war, in this case, against a very powerful adversary, is important. There is also a need to enhance the metrics on war.

Any delay in public engagement on the issue of going to war may risk a high level of unpreparedness on the part of the Philippines in the event of China’s “crossing the red line” during the regular implementation of its combat readiness patrols. A case in point is the maritime collision in the South China Sea which was caused by a Chinese Coast Guard vessels’ intentional-high speed ramming of a Philippine supply ship that resulted in the serious injury to a Filipino navy personnel (Voice of America, June 18, 2024). If the navy personnel had succumbed to his serious injuries, a war scenario with China would have evolved eventually.

The Philippines could learn from Taiwanese efforts in handling the possibility of war with China. Taiwan’s tangible military capabilities and intangible will to resist are essential to the prevention of Chinese attacks against Taiwan (Lee, 2022). Three essential factors were identified. One, political party identification has a strong impact on Taiwanese respondents’ views on U.S. security commitment. For example, the U.S. government’s decision to abstain from deploying troops in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War has diminished Taiwanese confidence on U.S. security commitments. Two, respondents’ perception of U.S. security commitment and confidence in the Taiwanese military’s ability to defend are correlated. Among the respondents who believed in U.S. deployment of troops to Taiwan, about three quarters exhibited confidence in the Taiwan military’s ability to defend. Among respondents who did not think the U.S. would send troops to defend Taiwan, three quarters were not confident in the defense ability of the Taiwan military. This trend explains that when the Taiwanese people evaluate the island’s defense, they consider the combined capabilities of their military and the U.S. military. The Taiwanese public’s views of the Taiwanese military’s ability determines its resolve to fight. If China invades Taiwan, the majority of the respondents who expressed confidence in the Taiwanese military also showed willingness to defend Taiwan (Lee, 2024).

The heightened tensions in the South China Sea, which is exacerbated by China’s deployment of combat readiness patrols (a distinct show of military might), highlights the need for the Philippines to achieve sustained military preparedness. The costs are high if the Philippines unexpectedly goes to war insufficiently prepared. Sustained military preparedness during peace time requires a comprehensive perspective and understanding of leaders and the local population about the functions and impact of war and anti-war measures.

The Philippines subscribes to the ideal of the United Nations, where states must maintain their relations in a harmonious manner in order to achieve stability. While the Philippines continue to exhaust all legal means available under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to deal with Chinese coercive actions into its territory, the country should help prepare its citizens for the possibility of war. Philippine efforts to primarily rely on international law to counter the malevolent actions of China in the South China Sea may prove to be insufficient in the long run. By dealing with the fog of war, the Philippines must prepare and encourage its citizens to show strong resolve to defend its territory, when, and should the need arise.