Issue Focus

The ROK-U.S. alliance, in place since 1954, now confronts a genuine crisis, vividly illustrated by the sharp curtailment of the 2026 Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) combined exercise. On August 16, on the eve of the exercise, President Trump directed Defense Secretary Hegseth to substantially reduce it. On the 18th, USFK Commander Gen. Xavier Brunson informed

A Continuous arc of tension Ever since 1949, Beijing has sought to restore control over territories once linked to its imperial sphere, adapting its methods to its increasing capabilities. On land, this took the form of successive campaigns to “reunify” the national territory; at sea, it has evolved through three main phases — securing coastal

The discourse on US-Japan shipbuilding cooperation materialized in earnest in April 2025, prompted by US Secretary of the Navy John Phelan’s proposal during interviews with Japanese media. The interview highlighted the manufacturing of commercial vessels convertible for military use and Japanese investments in the US West Coast shipbuilding industry. Prior to his visit to South

Following Donald Trump’s reelection in 2025, he made a congratulatory call with Seoul during which he emphasized the importance of strengthening Republic of Korea (ROK)–U.S. cooperation in the shipbuilding sector.1) Acknowledging South Korea’s advanced shipbuilding capacity, Trump has underscored its strategic importance for revitalizing the U.S. shipbuilding industry during the call. In parallel, between 2024

본 논문은 2021년 출범한 미·영·호 3국 안보 파트너십인 AUKUS의 역사적 배경, 전략적 논리, 제도적 구조, 기술적 도전 및 전략적 함의를 심층 분석하고, 이를 바탕으로 한국의 핵추진잠수함(SSN) 획득을 위한 ‘ROKUS(ROK-US)’ 협력 모델의 발전 방향을 제시한다. AUKUS는 단순한 기술 이전 협정을 넘어, 호주의 막대한 재정 투자와 미국의 조선업 병목 해소, 영국의 설계 역량을 결합한 ‘분업형 산업 통합’

ASEAN’s internal divisions have encouraged the proliferation of various mini-lateral partnerships seeking to uphold the regional maritime order over the last decade. As an alternative to ASEAN centered multilateralism, these new smaller groupings provide a more flexible and direct route to security cooperation among states sharing common threat perceptions. Most of these mini-groupings depend, either

The problem of illegal Chinese fishing in the Yellow Sea has been a thorny issue between Korea and China over the past two decades since the Korea-China Fishery Agreement entered into force in 2001. After dwindling due to the restrictions put in place during the Covid-19 pandemic, illegal Chinese fishing has reemerged as a hot

On May 21, 2025, China’s Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) declared a “no-sail zone” in the Yellow Sea, known as the West Sea in Seoul. This declaration applies within the Provisional Measures Zone (PMZ), a maritime area in the center of the Yellow Sea where the exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of China and South Korea overlap.

On April 25, 2025, Kim Jong Un launched a new 5,000-ton Choe Hyon-class destroyer, purportedly to expand North Korea’s “operational range and preemptive strike capabilities.” The multipurpose destroyer is equipped with anti-air and anti-ship missiles, and can bearmed with tactical nuclear-capable ballistic and cruise missiles. The Supreme Leaderindicated that the new ship would patrol North